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Albania: More Claims Made in 'OSCE Observer Scandal'

AU2006151096 Tirana ATA in English 1826 GMT 18 Jun 96

[Report by K. Shegani]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 18 (ATA)—Several articles and facsimiles published by the newspaper ALBANIA about the inclusion of the observers invited by the Socialist Party [PS] and picked out among the European extreme left in the lists of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observers to the May 26 parliamentary elections in Albania, have not yet been dismissed by those included in "the OSCE observer scandal."

The article published by ALBANIA during the last week have found a wide echo in the Albanian press. The left newspapers, although criticising these articles, have provided not fact to dismiss their content.

The aforesaid people include agents of the former State Security, ill-famed body of the communist regime in Albania.

Nine of the OSCE observers to the May 26 elections in Albania had been invited by the PS. The PS had chosen them among a Norwegian extreme left political grouping (The Norwegian working youth) that has nothing in common with the Social-Democratic Party of Norway. This observer group from Norway was attached on May 10 to the Central Electoral Commission as observers invited by the PS and after ten days, on May 20, the OSCE coordinator, Mark Power, attached the nine to the Central Electoral Commission as OSCE observers.

The status of the OSCE observer to the May 26 parliamentary elections in Albania was also granted to Tue Magnussen from Denmark who turns out to have been close friend and collaborator with late dictator Enver Hoxha. Magnussen has been visiting Albania since in the 70s. His name has been for nearly 20 years the most renowned name among the Albanian political communist circles.

Also the Bulgarian observer, Ivan Kostandinov, invited by the Socialist Party to the May 26 elections in Albania, turns out to be a former agent of Sigurimi.

Ivanov was recruited as agent of the Albanian secret police in 1970. His activity mainly included Bulgaria, but Ivanov has also served as a coordinator of the agents' network of the Albanian secret police in the eastern countries. Ivanov who was invited by the PS as observer to the May 26 parliamentary elections, during the last 25 years has been preparing secret reports on the Albanian secret police.

The German Wolfgang Erich Stoppel, also OSCE observer to the May 26 elections in Albania, had been spying on his own compatriots to the Albanian secret services.

Stoppel came to Albania for the first time in 1983 and has been systematically spying to the Albanian secret services on a good part of the Germans who visited Albania at that time and especially those Germans who were members of the Albania-Germany friendship association.

The OSCE report on the May 26 elections in Albania says that 32 of 79 articles, which have to do with the pre-election period the elections day, have been violated.

Attending the June 16 elections in 17 constituencies in Albania, the Austrian observer, Grossruck, said that the voting was fair. Grossruck, who also attended the May 26 elections, said that the OSCE report points to several technical shortcomings, which have not affected the voting result and that such errors are inevitable.

Confirming the calm election climate in the polling stations, Italian Senator Piero Pelicini said that: "We consider the Sunday voting technically and not politically."

Albania: Berisha Departs for Crans Montana To Attend Forum

AU2106065596 Tirana ATA in English 1641 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 20 (ATA)—Albania's President Sali Berisha today left for Crans Montana, Switzerland, to take part in the Annual Forum of political leaders and business, due to be held from June 20-23, 1996.

President Berisha will have meetings with many distinguished politicians and representatives of business circles, participants in the forum.

Albania: Deputy Defense Minister Meets Marshall Center Team

AU2006151496 Tirana ATA in English 1853 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 18 (ATA)—A delegation of the Marshall Center is visiting Albania as part of the cooperation between the Marshall Center and the Albanian educational military institutions.

The visit of the delegation follows the successful visit of the second Defence College to the Marshall Center in Germany.

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The delegation is made up of Ambassador Marshall Brement, chief of European Security Studies Department, and Colonel Jack Piter, dean of the Marshall Center. The delegation was received today at the Defence Ministry by deputy Minister Luan Lazimi.

Lazimi thanked the delegation on behalf of the Defence Minister for the continuous support provided by the Marshall Center in the context of its already known cooperation with the Albanian Defence College. He also stressed the indispensability of promoting this cooperation in the future. "The training of Albanian civil and military students by the Marshall Center has greatly helped the modernisation of Albanian Army as an army of Western models," he said.

Referring to the promotion of cooperation in education and military, the two sides emphasised the concrete aid provided for the Defence Academy and the changes carried out in this institution.

On the same day, the representatives of the Marshall Center had a briefing with high ranking defence officers.

Albania: Ex-Communist Leaders Sentenced to Life Imprisonment

AU2006205496 Paris AFP in English 2036 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 20 (AFP)—Three leaders of Albania's now disbanded hardline communist party were jailed for life Thursday after a court found them guilty of crimes against humanity while three others were given sentences of up to 20 years in prison.

A Tirana court ruled that Foto Cami, the communists' ideologue, former defense minister Prokop Murra and Muho Asllani, a local party official, were involved in "massive deportations of citizens in violation of the Albanian constitution and international conventions."

Former communist party first secretary Gaqo Nesho, one-time Tirana police chief Dilaver Bengasi and Zef Loka, former secret police chief, were jailed for 16, 18 and 20 years respectively on the same charges.

Since the fall of communism in Albania in 1992, 15 former communist leaders out of a group of 38 former officials, charged with genocide and crimes against humanity, have been convicted.

Three of them—Zylyftar Ramizi, Aranat Cela and Rrapi Mino—were sentenced to death and two others, Manush Muftiu and Haxhi Lleshi, jailed for life.

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Bulgaria: Videnov Meets With Sofia BSP Leaders

AU2006185396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 20 Jun 96

[Report by Lilyana Yancheva]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the moment the newly elected members of the Sofia City Council of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and the BSP district councils in the city are talking with BSP Supreme Council Chairman Zhan Videnov.

In his speech at the meeting, Zhan Videnov declared that there is no more important sociopolitical event today, an event that links together all the country's socioeconomic problems and its future government, than the presidential election campaign, which is now gathering pace. He said that it is necessary through the elections to remove a president who continues to strive to gain much more power than that granted to him under the Constitution, who has concentrated his efforts on trying to show that parliament is discredited, the government helpless, and the judiciary split by intrigues, and who behaves as if he is the main opposition force in the country.

As for the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], Videnov said, it seems to me that it wants its candidate Petur Stoyanov to be precisely the same sort of president.

As far as the BSP is concerned, Videnov continued, the president should never be a figurehead or a weak personality. He should work in three main directions: to ensure the social and political consolidation of power, to secure cooperation between the various institutions of power, and to bring about greater public conviction of the social sense and orientation of the transition.

Bulgaria: OSD's Kyuranov Views BSP Infighting

AU2106093196 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 21 Jun 96 p 9

[Interview with OSD leader Chavdar Kyuranov by Sevda Dinovska; place and date not given: "BSP's Policy Continues To Be Confrontational"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dinovska] Mr. Kyuranov, was the Alliance for Social Democracy [OSD] not making a claim to return to real power through the nomination of Georgi Pirinski as the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] presidential candidate?

[Kyuranov] We have always been more interested in real politics than in real power. We have always considered the most important issue to be what policy is to be conducted.

[Dinovska] However, it is also important who is conducting this policy. Pirinski did not miss the opportunity to remind the participants in the Sunday plenum that he is an OSD member.

[Kyuranov] I thank him for this, because for tactical purposes he could have ignored the OSD. However, Georgi [Pirinski] did not dissociate himself from us. On the contrary, he pointed out his affiliation.

[Dinovska] People in the Union of Democratic Forces said that Pirinski's nomination is a trap for the OSD. If the Constitutional Court annuls his candidacy [on the grounds of citizenship; Pirinski was born in the United States], not only he will be thrown off the political stage, but the OSD will also be affected.

[Kyuranov] There are no legal grounds for annulling Pirinski's nomination. In addition, the disappearance of a particular person from the political stage cannot affect the OSD, because the OSD is not a single personality, but a factor that is necessary for the BSP's development. This is so because the BSP cannot continue to be a postcommunist party. It must continue along the road of change, upon which it embarked after 10 November 1989, at the 14th [Bulgarian Communist Party] and 39th [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Congresses. Progress along this road was interrupted at the 40th BSP Congress. Timid attempts to revive it were made at the 41st Congress. Now is the time to declare that the policy of reform is the only one that must be followed.

[Dinovska] Recently you have appeared to be one of the most "gnarly" members of the BSP Supreme Council. You are constantly criticizing the government, prime minister, and BSP leadership.

[Kyuranov] This is true up to a point, but the main reason is the fact that most of my colleagues in the BSP supreme Council are not doing this. When there are not enough people engaging in such a criticism (despite the fact that I am not the only one), the few who do appear to be "gnarly." The criticism we are addressing to the government and the socialist leadership is related to the policy that is conducted and the need to change this policy. This criticism has never been directed at a particular person, but only at policy, style, and methods.

[Dinovska] All right, what is wrong in the present leadership's policy, style, and methods?

[Kyuranov] BSP policy continues to be predominantly confrontational. Recently, one has been able to observe the rudiments of change. When the change becomes predominant OSD criticism in this respect will end. Solid political support is needed now that we are about to carry out reforms that will have serious social consequences. The style and methods of work must also change. When the new leadership was elected (on 16

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June—editorial note), methods were allowed that have no place in a democratic party....

[Dinovska] However, your charter points out that the chairman proposes the members of the Executive Bureau while the Supreme Council only approves or rejects them, without making any proposals. Nevertheless, the members of the Supreme Council tried to contest this right of Videnov's.

[Kyuranov] I am also familiar with the charter. It says that the BSP chairman proposes members for election in the Executive Bureau. It does not say that the Supreme Council members may not make proposals. No one may deprive the supreme party organ of the right to adopt political decisions during the period between congress, and certainly not deprive it of the right to propose members of the Executive Bureau.

[Dinovska] In the final analysis people were forced upon Videnov who were not on his list. It must be remembered that the bureau is a team gathered by the BSP leader.

[Kyuranov] By team one should not understand an army unit, in which the commander commands the rest. The team is determined first of all through unity of thought not the whims of the commander, on the great tasks the BSP is facing. The criteria by which the members of the Executive Bureau should have been elected is their attitude to the reform.

[Dinovska] However, you, the OSD leader, proposed Nikolay Kamov and Yuriy Borisov as bureau members. One of them [Yuriy Borisov] is considered a good disciple of Aleksandur Lilov.

[Kyuranov] I do not underestimate at all the differences the OSD has with Mr. Lilov, Aleksandur Marinov, and some others. During the last year, however, both Kamov and Borisov have carved out their own image in the parliamentary group and BSP leadership, and therefore I proposed them. However, I was disturbed by the fact that people who had great differences with the chairman in their positions had to leave the Executive Bureau. In the history of our movement there have been leaders who adhered to preserving the right to different opinions in the organ they led. We must not return to the past. Now the BSP has significant possibilities. For me, the fact that the Supreme Council rallied around Georgi Pirinski with such a large majority is a guarantee that the party infighting will now subside, at least until the presidential elections. By this I do not mean to imply that the disputes will erupt again once the elections are over.

[Dinovska] Do you share the view that the leadership of the parliamentary group must be changed?

[Kyuranov] I say quite clearly that I want to avoid this question. A short while ago the OSD issued an appeal to the BSP to end all these quarrels, disputes, brawls, insults, insinuations, intrigues, and so on.

[Dinovska] You evaded my question about the Democratic Left parliamentary group leadership.

[Kyuranov] I evaded this question for precisely the same reason—let us not begin a quarrel as to whom we should topple.... The job now is not to topple a particular person, but to elect Mr. Georgi Pirinski as the head of state.

Bulgaria: Declining Arms Exports Reported in Period 1991-95

AU2106075596 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 21 Jun 96 p 16

[Article by Andrey Borodin: "Bulgaria at Bottom of Arms Business"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the period 1991-95 Bulgaria dropped to 29th place in exporting and 40th place in importing weapons. This data is included in the report of the Stockholm International Institute on Peace Research (SIPRI), which is available in Moscow.

The drop is obvious. In 1991 Bulgaria exported conventional weapons worth $8 million [as printed], in 1992 $60 million, in 1993 $21 million, and in 1994 $29 million. According to SIPRI, last year Bulgaria did not make any money from weapons sales. A zero stands next to Bulgaria's name in 1995.

Russia achieved good results in recent years with its arms export. In 1995 Russia was in the second place. However, its former clients from the socialist bloc, including Bulgaria, have cut their military spending significantly. Afghanistan (28th), Hungary (27th), Bulgaria (40th), Slovakia (48th), and Poland (50th) remain in the top 50 arms importers. However, such major customers of the former Soviet arms as Mozambique, Cuba, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Laos have disappeared from the list.

Bulgaria: French Firm Expresses Interest in Buying Uranium

AU2106072296 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 21 Jun 96 p 6

[Article by Zhivka Angelova: "French Desire Our Uranium, Want To Clean Kozloduy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] DUMA has learned that Jean-Pierre Souviron and Cyril L'Hunot, representatives of the SISIE [expansion not known] French Economic Group want to purchase our unprocessed uranium

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and clean the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant of nuclear waste. They briefed Nikola Koychev, chief of the National Assembly Economic Commission, and Emil Kostadinov, member of the National Assembly Budget Commission, on their investment intentions. Ministers Rumen Gechev [economy], Stamen Stamenov [transportation], and Atanas Paparizov [trade and foreign economic relations] also know about the French intentions. According to their calculations, the uranium-cleaning technology will cost about $100 million. The French plan envisages an audit of the Bulgarian uranium capacities, their restoration, and acquiring new positions in the markets. [passage omitted]

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Czech Republic: Daily on Problems Facing 'Inexperienced' Lebed

AU2106091996 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 20 Jun 96 p 8

["Analysis" by Jiri Doubrava: "Right at the Beginning, General Lebed Has Been Taught a Hard Lesson in the Deceitfulness of Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—Right from the start, the new star on the Russian political firmament, retired Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed, faces the difficulty of not losing his luminescence.

The man who in Sunday's [16 June] presidential elections came in, surprisingly, in third place and shocked analysts and rivals with his 15 percent of the vote has been taught the lesson that politics is not the same as commanding armies. As observers immediately pointed out on Monday, the political playing field may be too slippery for the honest and uncompromising soldier.

On Tuesday, a couple of hours after taking office as secretary of the Security Council, Lebed appeared on television and announced that he had managed to prevent a coup d'etat. Allegedly, this had been attempted by generals who did not accept the results of the first round of the presidential elections. Pavel Grachev was also accused. He had submitted his resignation as defense minister shortly beforehand because he could not come to terms with the fact that he would be subordinate to his former subordinate.

In the opinion of Russian analysts, when he slammed the door, Grachev took an original form of revenge on Lebed. He let him, so to speak, "swallow a viper." He foisted a nonexistent putsch on Lebed and then just waited, with the bitter smile of a man exiting from high-level politics, to see how big the whole scandal would be.

This is no small thing in the run-up to the second round of the presidential elections, when Yeltsin and Lebed will depend on every vote against Zyuganov. Lebed can now only rely on playing down the whole affair until it fades away.

Observers maintain that such things may happen again to Lebed, who is inexperienced in politics. He has many qualifications for behaving like a bull in a china shop. No one denies his forcefulness and ability as a commander. For this very reason, he won surprisingly so many votes, but he can have no experience with subtle political games.

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also had to confirm that no putsch took place. Yeltsin preferred to keep quiet out of solidarity with his new partner.

Russian journalists claim that Yeltsin had resolved to link up with Lebed even before the elections. According to them, Lebed suits the current Russian president as an inexperienced fellow traveler, who will soon find out that, without the advice of his big brother, he will make mistakes.

Nevertheless, the analysts agree on one thing: When Lebed gets the hang of "it," he may become the head of state after Yeltsin. One small thing is left for him: to complement his undoubted talent as a commander and gruff voice with knowledge of the niceties of insidious political methods.

Czech Republic: Vaclav Havel on NATO's New Role, Expansion

WS2106094396 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 22 Jun 96 p 13

[Article by Czech President Vaclav Havel: "New Definition—North Atlantic Treaty Unchanged"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the first time in the history of mankind, our civilization has become truly global, encompassing the entire world. Yet, at the same time, perhaps because of its global character, it is marked by increasingly determined attempts made by various cultures and regions at preserving their distinctiveness. In my view, the best alternative to the future development of civilization is the emergence and furtherance of larger regional groups and mutual cooperation.

In modern-day Europe, there is no better democratic defense structure than NATO. The alliance bridges Europe with North America—two continents that maintain close ties rooted in shared spiritual values, shared values, and shared political mores. It is a huge and powerful organization guided by principles of nonaggression, which safeguard it against possible threats, regardless of where they come from, thus allowing the group to be internally stable on an unprecedented scale. I deeply believe that all of the other European states, which feel that they are in a part of the world organized along NATO values, yet have the sense of being suspended in an odd vacuum, should be given the opportunity of gradually entering the alliance, provided they are politically and technically prepared.

We know very well that for years NATO served primarily as a shield protecting the free world against the possible expansion of Soviet communism to the West. The threat of that expansion no longer exists. NATO should thus clearly and precisely redefine its role as a regional defense alliance prepared to ward off all threats, regardless of where they come from, and, at the request of those interested, ready to avert

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local conflicts in Europe. The new definition of NATO's mission need not imply the necessity of amending the North Atlantic Treaty on the basis of which the alliance was established. On the contrary. The alliance should return to the initial letter of the treaty, which plainly provides not only for the defensive role it is to play, but also for openness and the readiness to defend the fundamental values shared by the member states.

Czech Republic: Commentary on Slovakia's Deaf Ear to West

AU2006142596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 19 Jun 96 p 12

[Commentary by Karol Wolf: "Bratislava's Western Ear Is Still Deaf"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The intensity and unequivocal nature of the Western warnings directed at Bratislava are increasing steadfastly, but, so far, they have not had any effect. The pattern for Slovak-Western dialogue today looks roughly like this: A Western politician comes to Slovakia—conceivably, a representative of an institution such as NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe, or the North Atlantic Assembly—and says that, for the sake of its integration into the West, Bratislava should pay greater attention to stability and the democratic nature of the domestic political scene. The concrete statement that Slovakia is already ceasing to be viewed as a member of the first group of neophyte NATO entrants (as the head of the North Atlantic Assembly, Karsten Voigt, said on 17 June) has also been appended to such pronouncements recently. A high ranking Slovak politician—for instance, the prime minister, president, or parliament chairman—then states that Slovakia is striving incessantly for integration into the West. And that is all. Nothing more happens, and this bizarre game goes on.

It is possible to come up with several theories that could explain the nature of Bratislava's loss of hearing. The extreme limits of these theories could, on the one hand, extend as far as the hypothesis that the Slovaks want to but do not know how to and, on the other, all the way up to the other extreme that they do not want to at all and know very well why they are deaf.

The current state of Slovakia's Western aspirations, obviously, lies somewhere in the middle of this set of possibilities—probably closer to the first extreme—and it can be described as follows: The vast majority of Meciar's ruling team is convinced that the country has to anchor itself in the community of Western countries. This hypothesis can be based on the facts from the ruling Cabinet's policy statement, where it is written clearly that integration into NATO and the EU is among its foreign policy priorities. On the other hand, Meciar and his people are determined to govern the country according to their own rules and regardless of Western practice. The momentary deafness is, then, an attempt to ride out quietly the storm of Western warnings and to outstrip all of the problems by constantly repeating the declaration about the effort to integrate into the West.

This approach can be described briefly in these two tenets: The first: Yes, we want to join NATO, but we will do at home what we consider appropriate. The second: They will admit us in the end anyhow because our geopolitical position will compel them to do so.

It is as plain as day that the two tenets are misguided, and, if they continue to be applied, Slovakia will simply not get into NATO in this phase. On the one hand, because NATO is not interested—and will not be interested—in a member that does not behave at home like a democrat and, on the other, because the time has long passed when NATO expanded mainly in view of the raging Cold War—that is, because of the geostrategic position of a given country (for example, Turkey).

Of course, it is also possible to envisage that in Bratislava they are merely tightening their strings and that common sense will prevail in the end. Unfortunately, there are ever fewer reasons that would offer scope for this assumption. Namely, we always have to ask why Slovakia behaves the way it behaves and why there is not even a hint of change. Of course, if we leave out the recent grotesque analysis by governing Deputy Jozef Prokes (deputy prime minister in Meciar's second government, with responsibility for integration into the EU and NATO), who said: "It is like when you run after someone, he (meaning NATO) runs away from you. When you run away, he runs after you."

Czech Republic: ODA Officials on Participation in Coalition

AU2106081596 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "(mrk, sa)": "The Alliance's Coalition Dilemma"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even to this day, when the personnel composition of the new Cabinet is supposed to be discussed, the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] is not certain about whether it will be part of the new coalition. Only the pragmatic wing led by Deputy Chairman Vladimir Dlouhy is unequivocally in favor of this.

Dlouhy yesterday described his party's participation in the future governing coalition as categorically evident.

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"The coalition agreements are moving in this direction," he said to back up his claim. He thus refuted the speculation that ODA could go over to the opposition. The leader of the Alliance's deputies, Ivan Masek, had referred to this possibility on Sunday's [16 June] "Debata" program. Nevertheless, Dlouhy acknowledges that agreement still has to be reached with the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party on certain important issues.

On the other hand, ODA Chairman Jan Kalvoda yesterday refused to reply to a question on whether his party will leave the coalition if the ODS insists at today's meeting on a majority in the Cabinet, which is generally expected. "At the moment, we are not in the coalition," he emphasized. According to him, its view on a majority in the government is, for ODA, its view on the stability of the government as well: "We have not altered our stance in this sense. A majority is unacceptable to us." But, according to Kalvoda, ODA is seeking "a means of being in position, not vice versa." At the same time, the second man in ODA, Dlouhy, more than the issue of the ratio of forces in the government, is emphasizing the avowal in the coalition agreement to lower taxes, support growth, and reduce the share of public budgets in the gross domestic product.

Ivan Masek confirmed yesterday that no agreement has yet been reached within the coalition on the economic part of the program, which differs from the party's priorities. "We are willing to make a certain compromise," maintains Masek, "but we will insist on many things." Masek indicated that the main argument is between the ODS and ODA, although the Alliance apparently is not inflexible. "We are sensible; we know that we cannot copy our program into the coalition agreement." He confirmed the limited nature of the joint agreement on decentralizing the state administration. It apparently must not be overestimated. "If Klaus says a region and not a kraj [county], there may also be self-administration in the districts. However, I would not perceive a problem in this; he would remain isolated with such a stance," he told LIDOVE NOVINY.

Czech Republic: Report Suggests Havel Opposes ODS Majority

AU2006172196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by "(ina, jik)": "Havel Does Not Want the ODS To Have a Majority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—President Vaclav Havel indicated during Tuesday's [18 June] secret talks with the chairmen of the coalition parties that the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] should not have the majority of seats in the next cabinet. A senior representative of this party confirmed yesterday that Havel had spoken on the telephone with the prime minister about his stance. "He spoke with Klaus about it by telephone. He made it clear that he would be pleased if none of the parties had a majority in the government," he said.

The chairmen of the other two parties, Josef Lux and Jan Kalvoda, who, unlike Klaus, had met with the president in his residence late on Tuesday evening, denied after the meeting that the subject of a majority had come up in the conversation. But Havel's spokesman, Ladislav Spacek, acknowledged it. Of course, he refused to confirm Havel's opinion. "This is a matter for the coalition. The president will not publicly intervene in this," Spacek said.

Kalvoda claimed immediately after the meeting with Havel that he had merely briefed the president on the coalition talks. "The president invited us to give him a report on the course of the talks on establishing a coalition. We did not discuss anything; we merely briefed him," he said.

He reiterated that both the Civic Democratic Alliance and the People's Party shared the view that the ODS should not have more seats in the Cabinet than the other two coalition parties put together. "We did not discuss a majority with the president now, but we insist that the ODS should not have it," said Kalvoda.

The meeting in the president's residence lasted for two and a half hours. Lux was the first to arrive at Havel's villa at 2000; Kalvoda arrived an hour later. Lux remained in the residence until the end. All three, including the president, were apparently taken aback by the fact that they had not managed to keep their meeting secret from journalists. "The president is nervous," Havel's bodyguard revealed.

The president, wearing a purple T-shirt, welcomed Lux and Kalvoda at the door and did not go out to the garden with them, even when they left. The talks involving Kalvoda, Lux, and Havel were so confidential that neither the Castle nor the secretariats of the two coalition parties wanted to confirm them even just before they commenced.

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Slovakia: Daily Sees Last Chance for NATO Consideration (Corrected)

AU2006154796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Jun 96 p 4

[Corrected version of AU1906153996, incorporating change in third paragraph as noted: Commentary by Jan Skoda: "The Way (to NATO) Remains Blocked"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Through their well-meant advice, or, rather, well-meant and diplomatically correct words, our Western partners have been trying to tell us something: they keep dropping hints, providing explanations, producing examples—and we go on ignoring it all. This sort of thing happened again on Monday [17 June] at the official talks between Karsten Voigt, chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, who tried hard to convince the German Social Democrat that the blame for the poor international image of his coalition does not lie with Slovak reality, but with the way Slovak reality is perceived in the West.

Thanks to foreign visitors, the government coalition's foolish arguments, which used to obscure the very essence of our problem, have been demolished step by step. Voigt also pointed out where the essence of our problem lies: in our reality and in the Meciar style of government.

Thus, after last Monday we should drop the argument that the main reason NATO wants us as a member is in our unique geostrategic location, in the fact that our country happens to be at the crossroads of trade routes, and so on. Likewise, we should drop the argument that we have no control over anything because NATO has to come to an agreement with Russia [changing "Austria" to read "Russia"] first. The point is that we have been given a clear signal to the effect that the decision about our entry [into NATO] will not be determined by the above-mentioned geostrategic considerations, but strictly by the state of our democracy. In this context it is worth recalling what Voigt said to PRAVDA when asked whether Prime Minister Meciar's arguments had persuaded him: "Even if NATO did take geostrategic considerations into account, any expansion for geostrategic reasons would not be approved unless the issue of democracy was OK as well."

We should not seek comfort in believing that Slovakia is not different from the other three Central European countries which, unlike our country, are not omitted by the U.S. Senate draft bill on NATO expansion. Perhaps we are different from the others after all—why else should a high-ranking Western legislator feel obliged to explain to us the meaning of the term "democratic traditions"?

The sad truth is that it is precisely our way of thinking that makes us different from other countries. Therefore, instead of pursuing pointless arguments about the difference between the perception of reality and reality itself, we ought to keep asking ourselves whether our deeds genuinely enhance Slovak democracy.

Another myth was demolished with Mr Voigt's help when it was said that small countries are joining NATO not only to enjoy greater security and stability, but also to avoid the need for developing their own expensive defense systems. This fact should silence above all those who claim that neutrality, rather then NATO membership, would be the cheaper alternative for Slovakia.

To sum up: Anyone willing to listen to the NAA chairman was told which way leads to NATO. Therefore we should be pleased that during his three-day visit to Slovakia Karsten Voigt was accompanied by Irena Belohorska, a government movement [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] deputy.

She is the very person responsible for the preparation of a report the NAA will get before the decision on the first round of talks on NATO expansion is made. Unless we take this opportunity, possibly our last one, then, of course, there will be the second round of talks—but when that will take place nobody knows.

Slovakia: Foreign Ministry Hails Russian Elections

LD2006222096 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Jozef Rebo reports from a regular news conference by the Slovak Foreign Ministry.

[Rebo] [Passage omitted] Commenting on the presidential elections in Russia, Juraf Matejovskiy, Slovak Foreign Ministry spokesman, said:

[Begin Matejovskiy recording] The Foreign Ministry appreciates the fact that the first direct presidential elections in Russia's modern history were democratic and carried out according to the law, and that the majority of voters supported the existing democratic and reform trend in the Russian Federation.

The Slovak Foreign Ministry expresses the conviction that this trend will be also reflected in the second, decisive election round. [end recording] [passage omitted]

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Slovakia: HZDS Daily on Eruption of 'Political Crisis'

AU2106073896 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Jan Smolec, chief editor and HZDS MP: "Is Greed Triumphant in Slovak Politics?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear Readers!

I am writing these lines in my parliamentary bench, during the lunch break. I do not know what will happen one hour from how, but I admit that I am extremely sad. Once again, a political crisis has broken out in Slovakia.

The day before yesterday I wanted to inform you that the government coalition was in jeopardy. But Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, who still has not fully recovered, did not want me to publish his statement: "The government is losing the support of the coalition partners in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR]."

Unfortunately, this was fully confirmed yesterday. As a matter of fact, the last three NRSR meetings were not coordinated and coalition cooperation did not function as it should. Centrifugal forces were making themselves felt in it. All of a sudden, the coalition partners do not want to support even laws that were included on the parliament's agenda on their own initiative. Their statements about [the need to include opposition representatives in] OKO [special supervisory body for monitoring secret service activity] and the National Property Fund [FNM] were made without any consultation with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. The prime minister's health problems, too, have surely contributed to the breakup of the present coalition. At the beginning of the week he could only say: "I have returned from sick leave too late to reverse this. The situation is extremely unfavorable for the government. Someone has suddenly prepared a coffin for us. But those who planned it forgot that the nails are in our hands. The HZDS is not going to leave the government."

Nothing else but the privatization interests of persons and groups must be seen behind all this. It is not politics that is the cause of the present crisis, but privatization greed. Money always was, and will remain, part of politics, but when one billion korunas "gets lost" in one institution in the interest of politics, it must definitely not be "hushed up." If someone soiled his hands in this case [allusion to dismissed management of Slovenska Poistovna, the Slovak Insurance Company], it is necessary to point the finger at him. The case cannot be solved politically either. Criminal prosecution bodies must become involved in it. Who knows, the lost billion might be found on the basis of this decision.

Rumors started to spread in parliament yesterday morning: The SNS [Slovak National Party] and the [Association of] Workers [ZRS] were holding talks with the opposition, first and foremost, about where they would establish themselves. From now on, it will be only the HZDS that will be steamrolled. Is there going to be a caretaker government? Are the SNS and the Hungarians going to embrace one another? How will the three Jans (Carnogursky, Slota, Luptak) get along?

The Tuesday talks of the so-called coalition fives were also unsuccessful and so the very first minutes of the 16th NRSR meeting indicated that the coalition has broken up. For some politicians, the primary concern is who will be in charge of the "golden hen." Slovakia's interests are secondary.

And the president is promptly entering the game.

May God protect Slovakia!

Slovakia: Meciar Addresses HZDS Officials on Coalition

AU2006162396 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by TASR: "Districts Are Leaning Toward the HZDS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Trencin—Vladimir Meciar, prime minister of the Slovak Republic and chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], held a consultative meeting with the chairmen of HZDS district and regional presidiums from the whole of Slovakia in the House of State Administration in Trencin yesterday. He familiarized them with the present domestic political situation, particularly with the results so far of the talks with the coalition partners SNS [Slovak National Party] and ZRS [Association of Workers of Slovakia], and informed them about possible solutions to the tense situation in the government coalition.

According to HZDS Spokesman Vladimir Hagara, at the meeting the prime minister instructed the chairmen of HZDS district presidiums to resume contacts with coalition partners at the local level. At the same time, as Vladimir Hagara stressed, Vladimir Meciar recommended to HZDS district functionaries to commence talks with representatives of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] in the regions. "Relations within the coalition are not the way they should be, the coalition partners have deflected from the coalition treaty. The coalition should assume shape in the foreseeable future."

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said Hagara when paraphrasing a part of Vladimir Meciar's speech. According to Vladimir Meciar, the HZDS is an open movement and is not negotiating just with the SDL but is preparing talks with other political parties as well. Vladimir Hagara did not specify which parties these were.

"In the discussion the participants in the meeting evaluated the situation in the coalition in a completely different way than the SNS and ZRS leadership. The information could be heard that some SNS district chairmen are leaning strongly toward the HZDS and also a number of ZRS representatives at the local level disagree with Jan Luptak's aspirations," Vladimir Hagara said.

Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar left the Trencin meeting with the chairmen of HZDS district and regional presidiums after approximately 90 minutes. After a break, the consultations continued without him.

Slovakia: Council Defies Kovac To Again Approve Foundations Bill

LD2006153096 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The deputies of the National Council [parliament] needed exactly one hour to unanimously approve the amendment to the Labor Code. [passage omitted] Jarmila Tosecka and Zuzana Stukovska report on other proceedings in parliament today:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] As scheduled, Michal Kovac, president of the Slovak Republic entered the debating chamber at the stroke of 1000. Parliament Speaker Ivan Gasparovic then asked him to present the bill on foundations approved on 22 May 1996 and to explain why he returned the bill to parliament for further debate. [passage omitted]

In a 15-minute speech, the president said that the state should support the activities of foundations through its legislation and thus help develop work beneficial for society. Kovac divided his objections into two main groups. The first contains those regulations that, according to the president, change the status of foundations in society and intervene in their activities to an extent that in effect amounts to their liquidation. His second objection points to the disharmony between the bill and the Slovak Republic's commitment as an associated state of the European Union [EU]. In addition to that, the president regards it as inevitable that the bill on foundations will be discussed together with laws which will regulate the legal status of nonprofitmaking bodies and noninvestment funds whose activities are beneficial for the general public. These laws should come into force on the same day.

In the final part of his speech, Michal Kovac told deputies:

[Kovac] Esteemed National Council. During the debate on the bill, it was argued that it adheres to the legal norms in EU countries. I am sorry to say that this is not so. An analysis from 10 May 1996 made for the European Commission is more than critical, even negative. The approved bill contains considerable differences when compared with the legislation of the European Union member countries and it does not correspond to the statement of the European Center for Foundations. During the second session of the joint parliamentary committee of the European Union and the Slovak Republic in Brussels, European Commission Commissioner Hans van den Broek made critical comments about the bill.

The Slovak Republic is striving for membership in European economic and security structures. In the association agreement it has made a commitment to harmonize its legislation with that of the European Union. The fulfillment of this commitment is also contained in the policy statement of our government. I cannot agree with the views that this bill is an expression of our sovereignty. Sovereignty does not mean that we do not need to honor international commitments, including the association agreement with the European Union. Therefore, I cannot see any political obstacles to approving a bill on foundations that would meet the requirements of the European Union. By doing so, the Slovak Republic would take a concrete step to confirm its declared interest in joining European structures.

If the bill is approved again without fundamental changes made to it, this parliament will send a negative signal to the democratic world. You will thus knowingly contribute to the worsening of our chances of integration into the European structures in the first stage of expansion of NATO and the European Union. If, at this parliament session, you do not send positive signals, we will confirm the increasingly vociferous claims that we are not mature enough to be invited to the consultations during the first stage of expansion of NATO and the European Union. Let us stop risking the future fate of our citizens and our state.

[Correspondent] President Michal Kovac then asked the deputies not to approve the bill on foundations again and added, and I quote: Do not forget that almost the entire democratic world is watching our bill on foundations. [passage omitted]

The decision about the bill on foundations was made at 1145. The result of the voting is as follows: out of 137 deputies present, 78 voted in favor, 52 against, and 7 abstained. [passage omitted] [end recording]

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Slovakia: Daily Accuses Slota of Initiating Coalition Breakup

AU2006162796 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 20 Jun 96 p 1

[Commentary by Viera Urbanova in the "Public Matter" editorial column]

[FBIS Translated Text] As the May poll on the preferences of the political parties and movements showed, two coalition partners have dropped in popularity rankings among voters below the 5-percent threshold [necessary to win seats in Parliament]. While the strongest political entity, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], maintains a huge lead over everyone else, the Slovak National Party [SNS] and the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] would not get into parliament at all, if elections were to be held now. However, the political leaders of Slota's and Luptak's parties, instead of pondering on the causes of their parties' loss of voters, are successfully carrying on with the self-destructive trend on which they have embarked. After the prime minister stepped on Jan Slota's privatization corn, the nationalists [narodniari] felt the urge to ingratiate themselves with the opposition, realizing very well that, when it comes to certain interests, all the sins and antagonisms of the past are forgotten. The talks between part of the coalition and the opposition on the eve of the 16th meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], the president's endeavor to address Parliament, and SNS and ZRS deputies' proposals to supplement the agenda of the plenary session of Parliament, all this indicates that the climate in Slovakia will become frostier in the days to come. Unless, of course, Vladimir Meciar grows wise and eases up on his uncompromising attitude toward, and views on, the [coalition partners'] method of fishing in privatization waters. The SNS leader recently admitted that the breakup of the coalition would be a catastrophe for Slovakia and did not forget to add that he would not initiate it. In spite of that, he is initiating it. Just as in March 1994, when the decisive role [in the dismissal of the then Meciar-led cabinet] was played by the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], which, as a consequence of its entry into Moravcik's government, lost a considerable number of its voters, so today, should the coalition split, the left-wing democrats could influence the further course of development. SDL Chairman Jozef Migas has made it clear, however, that he would not join either side. Officially, he will remain in the middle of the playing field. He is getting ready for new elections in two years. Migas wants to regain what Weiss squandered. And the ZRS leadership is playing splendidly into his hands. Turning away from the HZDS will indubitably mean political death for the SNS. And the ZRS will most probably go down in political history under a new acronym: the ZRJS—Zdruzenie Robotnikov Jednej Sezony [Association of Workers for One Season].

Is such a prospect for their parties really not decisive for the coalition bosses?

Slovakia: SNS's Slota Denies 'Breach of the Coalition Agreement'

AU2106080896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 20 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "According to Jan Slota, the SNS Has Not Violated the Coalition Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—During the approval of the agenda of the 16th National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] meeting yesterday, Slovak National Party [SNS] deputies gave support to a number of opposition proposals. Its coalition partner, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], on the other hand, did not vote for these proposals, which included, for example, the expansion of the OKO [special supervisory body for monitoring the activity of secret services], supervision of privatization, changes in the management of the National Property Fund [FNM], an amendment to the law on strategic companies, and so forth. On no account, however, does SNS Chairman Jan Slota consider this to be a breach of the coalition agreement.

Even the Year Has Four Seasons

This is how Jan Slota reacted to NARODNA OBRODA's question about the reasons why the SNS approved the opposition proposals, to which it denied its support at past NRSR meetings.

"The year has four seasons, everything is in a flux," Jan Slota said. He confirmed that the SNS would give support to these items even when they are actually discussed and that it agrees with the dismissal of FNM Vice President Milan Rehak and two other FNM members—Pavol Kacic and Jan Mikus.

Jan Slota refused to link "these matters" with the changes in the management of Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company] (which were to the SNS's disadvantage). Asked by journalists whether what he said would hold true even if the HZDS were more accommodating, he said: "We are not changing our views. When we say something, we stand by it."

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Slovakia: Rebellion Against HZDS May Cost Slota Chair

AU2106093796 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 20 Jun 96 p 9

[Commentary by Julius Gembicky: "Will Jan Slota Fall Victim to His Own Audacity?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to information from reliable sources close to the Slovak National Party [SNS], Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar met informally with Vitazoslav Moric, chairman of the SNS Club of Deputies in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], at the beginning of May. During this meeting, Vitazoslav Moric was supposedly offered the post of minister of transportation, post, and telecommunications. What made this offer lucrative was also the fact that, some time ago, the wife of Vitazoslav Moric participated in the privatization of the Vrutky Railroad Repair and Engineering Plant, on whose services the state railroads will depend in one way or another.

However, the offer also had its seamy side. The countervalue in this political trade-off was to be the taming, at the very least, of [SNS Chairman] Slota's coalition demands, particularly in the sphere of privatization. Naturally, this concerned, first and foremost, the three banks [remaining under state control]—Vseobecna Uverova Banka [General Credit Bank; VUB], Investicna a Rozvojova Banka [Investment and Development Bank; IRB], and Slovenska Sporitelna [Slovak Savings Bank; SLSP]—and Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company]. In the event of Jan Slota's intransigence, the possibility was floated of his replacement in the post of SNS chairman by someone less audacious and more indulgent toward the strategic plans of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. A few days later, this idea was developed further at Vladimir Meciar's working lunch with not only Vitazoslav Moric, but also Marian Andel [NRSR deputy chairman] and Jozef Prokes [SNS honorary chairman], members of Meciar's second cabinet, who participated in the unseating of Ludovit Cernak from the post of SNS chairman [in 1994].

These unofficial meetings of SNS honorary chairmen did not escape Jan Slota's political vigilance and were not without consequences.

Hardly any political observer paid any attention to, and scrutinized the reasons behind, the replacement on 22 May of Vitazoslav Moric by Melania Kollarikova in the post of chairman of the SNS Club of Deputies. Even if there was no open conflict between Jan Slota and Vitazoslav Moric, with this exchange Jan Slota and the majority of his supporters in the SNS Central Council and in the SNS parliamentary club took out an insurance policy against a possible attempt at another internal party coup and the elimination of the more radical Jan Slota from the post of party chairman.

To a considerable extent, the present crisis in the coalition has been initiated by the internal SNS crisis in the wake of the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty, which was a turning point for the SNS, by the twice-postponed repeated discussion of the Penal Code amendment [after its return to Parliament by President Kovac], and by the HZDS's refusal to support the SNS-initiated small amendment to the Education Law [concerning the teaching of history and the Slovak language and literature in Slovak at Hungarian-language schools]. The tension between the SNS and the HZDS escalated further after the dismissal of people who are close to the SNS from the management of Slovenska Poistovna. Jan Slota's reply to the plot prepared against him, and to the endeavor to push his party into the role of an extra in politics and in privatization, was the bold rebellion against the coalition partner HZDS at a meeting of the SNS Central Council at the beginning of June, at which demands were raised to enlarge the NRSR Special Supervisory Body for monitoring Lexa's secret service, and the National Property Fund, by opposition representatives. It is uncertain, however, whether, ultimately, it will not be Jan Slota himself who will have to pay the price for his audacity, since a number of SNS functionaries and deputies see their highest boss not in Jan Slota, but in Vladimir Meciar. They may give preference not to the one who can only promise them a great deal, but to the one who is in the position to also deliver at least a part of the promises.

Slovakia: HZDS Daily Calls For Acceptance of Opposition Demands

AU2106134696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 21 Jun 96 p 1

[Commentary by Jergus Ferko in the "Public Matter" editorial column]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]-Farmers Party of Slovakia [RSS]-Slovak National Party [SNS]-Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] coalition alliance is going through a serious crisis. It will do no harm to call to mind how the present government coalition actually came into being. Its formation was the result of a process, which was the product of two decisive factors. The first was the dismissal of Vladimir Meciar's government in March 1994 and the installation of Jozef Moravcik's multicolor cabinet. The second factor were the early parliamentary elections in the fall of the same year

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and the unwillingness of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] and, in particular, the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] to enter a coalition with the victorious HZDS. The Luptakites [ZRS members], too, were dragging their feet because, initially, they saw their role only in checking on government power. The most accommodating party in the process of the government formation was the SNS, whose chairman, Jan Slota, declared at the beginning of October 1994: "I cannot imagine a government without the HZDS and we are not going to enter a government without it." Today, this very Jan Slota is the embodiment of coalition disharmony and speculations have appeared in the press about whether he would keep the seat of SNS chairman.

The KDH and SDL were setting out conditions for their possible participation in the coalition—the cessation of attacks against the president, making privatization transparent, and changing the composition of the mass media councils and of the parliamentary body supervising the Slovak Information Service [SIS]. At that time, the HZDS was not overly inclined to meet those conditions because the trauma from the parliamentary coup, launched by the president, was still too fresh. The then radicalization of the HZDS was the logical consequence of a development, for which the leaderships of all the "Moravcikite" parties and President Michal Kovac were responsible.

Today, after almost two years, concurrently with the "softening" of the coalition, some of the demands from the fall of 1994 have reappeared. Today, there no longer exists a reason to reject many of them, quite the contrary.

The lesson from the development after March 1994 dictates, in the interest of democracy and stability in Slovakia, the formation of a government that would be able to rely on broader support in parliament. It will be necessary to part ways with some, and to come to an agreement with others. The result of the coalition crisis will be a renewed and expanded coalition that will be supported in parliament not just by 83 votes, but by a constitutional, that is, two-thirds, majority.

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Hungary: Privatization Expert on Economic Policy

AU2006140596 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 20 Jun 96 p 7

[Interview with Gyorgy Matolcsy, director of the Privatization Research Institute, by Eva Vasvari; place and date not given: "Hungary Has Become the Sick Man of the Region"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This year, the government is surpassing its—already flawed—economic policy and, as a result, consumption and real wages are decreasing more than planned. Gyorgy Matolcsy, director of the Privatization Research Institute, whom we interviewed in connection with the visit of the IMF delegation to Hungary, said that there is an increasing foreign opinion that Hungary has become the region's sick man regarding economic growth.

[Vasvari] How can the government present itself to the IMF's visiting delegation?

[Matolcsy] All in all, the evaluation is not very good because the Hungarian Government has not met its obligations fully. It is behind precisely in the areas where progress should have taken place, while it has advanced on the program points that have negative consequences—for example, the reduction of consumption and real wages. All these are clearly shown by the data because inflation, promised to be 20 percent, will obviously be 24 to 25 percent, and we can expect a 1 to 1.5 percent GDP growth as opposed to the 2 percent that was forecast. When we remember that growth is 7 percent in Poland and 5 percent in the Czech Republic, even the planned 2 percent is an impossibly low level. At the same time, according to all indications, the state administration's 1996 deficit will still exceed 4 percent of the GDP. In connection with this, it has to be noted that deviation from the target figure is not such a big problem in this case because this is an exaggerated commitment—even in the European Union, only two countries reach this level.

[Vasvari] The deficit of social insurance well exceeds the planned level. What is the reason for the increased deficit?

[Matolcsy] The government policy is to be blamed for this, because, rather than stimulating production, investment, and growth, it restricts the economy. In this situation, employment is more limited, wage and contribution payments are lower, and the enterprises and companies obviously do not pay in the amount of contributions that was originally expected.

[Vasvari] Is it essential to meet the IMF's requirements?

[Matolcsy] The government is not in a forced situation because it has not even used the $400 million credit facility and presumably will not do so in the future either, because, as the foreign currency reserves are higher than necessary, it does not need to. However, the situation is definitely bad in the sense that foreign opinions are increasingly asserting that Hungary has become the region's sick man in the area of economic growth.

[Vasvari] Is the IMF's opinion of Hungary—and of the Hungarian economy—important for us?

[Matolcsy] Not so much today because the government has, after all, made progress in privatization, and it has gained much appreciation among foreign investors through the—in my view, exaggerated—privatization of the energy sector. We have high foreign currency reserves, and there has been no break in the integration talks, and, therefore, in my view, the Hungarian Government can take a much tougher negotiating position.

[Vasvari] According to this, we need not be worried that we have to face new restrictions in order to meet the IMF requirements.

[Matolcsy] We need not. The half turn linked to Peter Medgyessy [finance minister] that, although quietly, is being implemented in the Hungarian economic policy allows us to anticipate that consumption and real wages will stop decreasing in 1997 and economic growth will reach 2 to 3 percent. In my view, the government will follow this road and will not return to Bokros's restrictive policy. However, it will not implement the full turn that would result in a strong, over-5-percent economic growth, stimulating investment policy, expanding consumption, and improving living standards.

[Vasvari] Can the international financial institutions tolerate this half turn?

[Matolcsy] I believe so. Compared to the commitments, the macroeconomic figures are not getting worse to an extent that would make it impossible to handle the processes. On the other hand, they welcome the fact that the Hungarian Government is not implementing the full turn that would actually be needed.

[Vasvari] How does Hungarian society assess the government's work and economic policy?

[Matolcsy] This has a subjective element: the replacement of the finance minister. Understandably, society reacted positively to Medgyessy because he communicates with society with visibly more ease and flexibility. The objective side of the assessment, however, is that the government is surpassing its—flawed—economic policy this year and, as a result, consumption and real

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wages are decreasing faster than planned. The situation of the vast majority of the population is clearly deteriorating.

[Vasvari] Can all this lead to social dissatisfaction?

[Matolcsy] All in all, perhaps not, but, in my view, people will have gathered their negative experiences by 1998. And in a democracy, they will vote.

[Vasvari] Some experts say that the international financial organizations exert a strong pressure on Hungary. What do you think?

[Matolcsy] International financial expectations—I am thinking now of the IMF—toward Hungary are so tough because the government and representatives of the Hungarian National Bank and the Finance Ministry have called this upon themselves. We cannot find the same IMF requirements in the Czech, Polish, Slovak, or Slovene economic policies. Therefore, I think that a turn or change should be initiated from within. We should not be more Catholic than the Pope: We should not aim at the Maastricht requirements straight away while the vast majority of the EU states do not meet these requirements either.

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B-H: Report Accuses U.S. of Sarajevo Massacre

AU2006160996 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 96 p 6

[Article by Milenko Predragovic: "Serb Republic To Become 'Hong Kong'!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. Administration has signed, through a consortium, a series of contracts with the government in Pale for the construction of a highway from Banja Luka via Doboj to the Yugoslav border and from Doboj to Pale, and the construction of two thermal power stations with the electricity grid. The cost of these projects is $2.25 billion!

Fighting Over Karadzic's Affections

Of course, this is only the first investment phase in the construction of the entire mega infrastructure of the Serb republic, which, translated into the language of current politics, represents a first-class sensation of international dimensions. We checked this information for the second time yesterday in top-level trade circles in Milan and London and it was again fully confirmed. The representatives of the U.S. consortium in these two European cities have asked that their companies remain anonymous for the time being, while the start of the construction work is envisaged for after the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The main question in this great investment is Radovan Karadzic and the ever louder U.S. demands that he be handed over to the Hague Tribunal. Whether the Americans have sincerely given up [odrekli] on Karadzic or whether this is just a bluff is still a question that remains unanswered even by those circles in Europe that should know.

The Russians and Americans are fighting over Karadzic's affections: The former have been showering Karadzic in political and literary awards of recognition, while the latter have taken concrete steps: They want to build up the Serb Republic, the same one that they were destroying as recently as last summer! The questions are considerable: Why have the Americans decided to end the war in Bosnia like this?

Was the Sarajevo Markale market twice signed with a U.S. hand, while the Muslims were only the ones to fire the shells on their own civilians, or did the Americans do the entire job? Radovan Karadzic knows the answer to this and his trip to The Hague would do more damage to U.S. President Clinton than to himself. Of course, the vast U.S. investment in the Serb Republic is not the result of such bribery, but obviously the result of long-term economic and strategic interests.

Searching for the answers to these questions in Milan, we found out what could be behind the U.S. investment into the mega infrastructure of the Serb Republic. The plan of the U.S. businessmen is simple: The Serb Republic is to become the Hong Kong of southeastern Europe! There are two reasons for this: First, the poverty-stricken southeast will be supplied with cheap, mass-produced goods and, second, the poor from this part of Europe will less likely travel to Western Europe, where they use the excuse of shopping trips to seek work.

Toward a "Third Yugoslavia"

At the same time, this Hong Kong in Bosnia would act as a kind of engagement ring for the establishment of the third Yugoslavia, which would be based on confederal ties, but, above all, would be based on the interest of big capital to attract everyone, and primarily the immediate neighbors. Apart from U.S. and European capital, the Asian and Oceanic capital would also participate in this great project, which will be accompanied by the construction of new airports (near Bijeljina, for example).

Why has the Serb Republic been chosen for all this and not the "federation?" The answer to this one is easy: The "federation," even if it is ever established, will be a constant source of strife and conflict. Of course, every good tailor takes his measurements twice before cutting the cloth and this entire fantastic story could be just a trick concocted by the intelligence services, a creation of some kind of a law, for example, for the U.S. genocide of the Bosnian Serbs. [sentence as published] Time will tell whether or not this story is true.

B-H: Serbs Say Their War Crimes Tribunal Has Legal Basis

LD2006220596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1955 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 20 Jun (SRNA)—The tribunal set up by the Serb Republic assembly has a legal basis under both international and constitutional law, Professor Smilja Avramov, an expert on international law, said today, and rejected the Hague tribunal's comment that the establishment of that tribunal was illegal.

Prof. Avramov explained that the establishment of tribunals comes under a constitutional category and added that the Serb parliament "used its constitutional powers" and that "such a tribunal was set up on the basis of sovereign will."

At a session yesterday, the Serb Republic People's Assembly approved a law on a special tribunal for war

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criminals and charged the government with completing all preparations for its functioning by Monday 24 June.

A Hague tribunal spokesman said yesterday that setting up that tribunal is illegal and that it contravenes the UN Security Council resolution which gave the Hague tribunal jurisdiction over all national tribunals.

B-H: Klickovic: Karadzic Very Likely To Contest Elections

LD2006201796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Jun (SRNA)—Serb Republic Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic has said on the issue of Brcko that the Serbs "should not give in, even at the cost of renewed clashes."

"Whatever the implications, we must not make any further concessions," Klickovic said in an interview for tomorrow's issue of Belgrade's biweekly DUGA.

He said that handing Brcko over to the federation "would mean the division of the Serb Republic in two and then sharing the fate of the Serbs of the Republic of Serb Krajina."

"This means that we will settle people in all border areas around Brcko, because under Dayton it belongs to the Serb Republic," Klickovic said.

"We will not allow Brcko to be a free zone where western mediators make deals to their own advantage," the prime minister stressed.

Klickovic announced that it is very likely that Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic will run in the elections and said that the people will decide about that.

B-H: Buha: SDS Election Candidates Not Appointed Yet

AU2106074996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1849 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 June (BETA)—In a statement for BK Television today, Serb Republic Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha denied the reports that the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) has already appointed the main candidates on the electoral lists.

The decision on all the candidates who will run in the elections will be made at the annual SDS assembly on 27 and 28 June. It will be decided then who will be the candidates for assembly members, president, and vice president, and it will also be determined who will be the main candidate [nosilac liste].

Today, the municipal SDS committee in Pale today again put forward Karadzic's candidacy for the president of the Serb Republic.

B-H: 'Sources' Say 3 Electoral Coalitions Exist in RS

AU2106113496 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jun 96 p 10

[Article by Senka Kurtovic: "Liberals and JUL Together"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Republic [RS], too, is undergoing intense preparations for the forthcoming elections, which, judging by everything, will (nevertheless) be held in September. Following a decision by the Interim Electoral Commission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) the Serb entity, too, should submit the coalition lists for the forthcoming elections by Friday. The public in the Federation knows only as much about the political parties in the RS and the relations between them as the rare representatives of (the mainly opposition) parties who are "paying host visits" to the Federation are willing to tell.

OSLOBODJENJE has learned from reliable sources that three formal blocks have been formed in the RS that will probably appear at the elections. Each of the parties will run independently at the local elections.

The first block consists of the ruling Serbian Democratic Party and the Serbian Radical Party headed by Nikola Poplasen. The second block, entitled the Democratic Patriotic Front is headed by Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic. Some call this block "the soft-core nationalists" and it comprises of: The Independent Radical Party Nikola Pasic, the Democratic Party from Bijeljina, which is a peculiar extension of Zoran Djindjic, the Party of Democratic Center from Trebinje, the Peasants' Party from Bosanska Dubica, and the Fatherland Party from Prijedor.

Those who like to call themselves "the hard-core" opposition or the leftist block are the Social Liberal Party, headed by Miodrag Zivanovic, united with the Independent Social Democrats of Milorad Dodik; the Socialist Party of the RS, headed by Zivko Radisic; and the Workers' Party, which emerged from the Yugoslav United Left, whose president is Mira Markovic, the wife of Serbian President Milosevic. The Workers' Party in the RS is headed by Mica Carevic. The fact is that this block comes as a bit of surprise, at least to those who are following the situation, particularly the alignment of the Banja Luka Liberals with the Yugoslav Left.

According to some assessments, this third "leftist block" could win between 30 to 35 percent of the votes at the elections, the Democratic Patriotic front about 20 percent, and could thus beat the ruling SDS and the Radicals. [sentence as published]. The validity of all this will only be known after the counting of the votes.

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B-H: Pale Serbs Demand Visas From Non-Serbian FRY Citizens

AU2006135596 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 96 p 24

[Report by B.C.: "Visas Only for Croats and Muslims From the FRY"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica—Entry visas for the Serb Republic only apply to FRY citizens of non-Serbian ethnicity, the Serb Republic government bureau in Podgorica has told us. Citizens of Croatian or Muslim ethnicity wanting to visit or pass through the Serb Republic will have to pay 45 German marks or 180 dinars and, we have been told by the Bureau, such visas will not be issued to men aged 16 to 60.

For Croatian and Macedonian citizens, visas will be issued at the border.

FRY citizens of Serb ethnicity will not require visas to enter or transit the Serb Republic.

B-H: Serb Arbitrator for Brcko Comments on Border Issue

LD2006095496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2229 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 19 June (SRNA)—Vitomir Popovic, [Bosnian] Serb Republic arbitrator for Brcko, said on 19 June, "According to the Dayton agreement, what is contentious is not the town of Brcko, but a part of the border line separating the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim Federation."

"It is my deep conviction that the contentious issue can only be that part of the territory which lies at the southern side toward Mt. Majevica; it is approximately 14-km long," Popovic told SRNA after being elected arbitrator for the contentious border around Brcko.

According to Popovic, the People's Assembly will finally establish the platform which will represent the basis for everything in connection with the arbitration.

"To achieve better quality of work I will be able to set up expert teams, particularly for legal matters, economics, and geodesy, which will include representatives both from the eastern and western parts of the Serb Republic and from Brcko," Popovic added. [passage omitted]

B-H: NATO: Agreement Signed on Interentity Line

AU2006183296 Paris AFP in English 1812 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 20 (AFP)—Bosnia's former warring parties have signed an agreement on small changes to the line marking out the country's two entities—the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska, NATO said Thursday.

Simon Haselock, spokesman for the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), said the agreement had been signed Wednesday by Serb officials. It had been signed previously by federation officials.

However, the thorny question of where the line goes in the Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja, which was Serb-held during the war but has since been handed over to the federation, remains undetermined as does the line in some villages in the Sapna region in eastern Bosnia.

The accord covered 44 points of contention on the line, which is over 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) long and which the international community insists is not a frontier. Small changes to the line were envisaged in the Dayton accords to rectify anomalies.

IFOR commander Admiral Leighton Smith must appove the changes before they take effect.

B-H: PM Muratovic Calls For Karadzic's Ouster

AU2006182996 Paris AFP in English 1815 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 20 (AFP)—Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic urged the international community Thursday to get rid of hardline Serb leader Radovan Karadzic or face disruptions to general elections planned for later this year.

Just hours after Karadzic defied the international community by signalling his intention to stand in the polls from which he has been debarred, Muratovic warned that the Serb leader would continue to try and undermine the vote, tentatively planned for mid-September.

"We warned the international community many times," Muratovic told journalists. "The only way to have elections and to change the situation is to get rid of Karadzic.

"Everybody in the world knows that they are capable to properly deal with this either by putting pressure on (Serbian President Slobodan) Milosevic or by proper intervention by all forces which are available here," the Bosnian premier added.

Karadzic was nominated by his Serb Democratic Party (SDS) Thursday as a candidate for the post of president of the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of seven separate votes planned for post-war Bosnia under the Dayton peace accords.

But as an indicted war crimes suspect, the hardline Serb leader is prohibited from standing in the polls or holding public office.

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Muratovic stressed that Karadzic "cannot be a candidate" under the terms of the Bosnian peace settlement, and added that his candidacy was merely a Serb ruse to disrupt the elections.

Muratovic also answered charges that Bosnian Serbs remaining in suburbs of Sarajevo which have reverted to government control have been subjected to discrimination and maltreatment.

The Bosnian prime minister said he was "really very surprised" by a recent statement by senior peace implementation official Michael Steiner, who said the Bosnian government was turning a blind eye to the victimisation of Serbs in the five districts.

"Mr. Steiner knows that 11,000 people here in Sarajevo were killed by Serbs and no serious incident has happened until now in the suburbs of Sarajevo" since they came under government control in March," Muratovic said, dismissing the reports of threats and mistreatment as "rumours."

B-H: No Active Role for U.S. in Planned Karadzic Arrest

BR2106145696 Copenhagen POLITIKEN in Danish 21 Jun 96 p 7

[Article by Jens Holsoe: "NATO Wants To Arrest Karadzic—The Bosnian Serb Leader Is Imprisoned in a Factory Complex—General Ratko Mladic Has Fled to Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb—Within the next few weeks, NATO special forces will attempt to arrest the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, who has been indicted for crimes against humanity. He is confined to his headquarters in a factory complex surrounded by at least 60 heavily-armed bodyguards, while NATO-led IFOR [Implementation Force] troops keep the buildings under constant surveillance.

"Radovan Karadzic cannot move more than a few meters without us knowing," a NATO officer said. NATO sources describe the following scenario for Karadzic's arrest in Pale, near Sarajevo:

The action against the factory complex will be carried out by a unit of the French Foreign Legion and British Special Air Service (SAS) forces. The Americans will support the action with their most advanced eavesdropping and tracking equipment. Out of deference to President Clinton's presidential campaign, American forces cannot play an active role in the operation owing to the risk of loss of human life.

According to a senior NATO source, the French are prepared "to do the dirty work," even though this will probably mean the loss of human life. The French Foreign Legion contains soldiers of both Croatian and Serbian origin who are willing to do whatever is required of them.

At the same time, top-secret talks are being held with more moderate Bosnian Serb politicians. They have been offered the prospect of a potentially positive solution to the problems associated with the Posavina corridor, that narrow strip of land in northeastern Bosnia which links the two halves of the self-proclaimed Republik Srpska, on which both the Croatians and the Serbs are making claims.

In return, they must retain control over the Serbian military and police forces which might think of running amok when Radovan Karadzic is on his way to the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

Mladic in Russia

The fear of hostage-taking or the killing of foreigners have been two of the reasons why people have so far refrained from arresting Karadzic and the other indicted war criminal, Ratko Mladic.

Mladic, meanwhile, smelled a rat, disappeared from his military headquarters northeast of Pale, and went to Russia, a diplomatic source in Zagreb said. In response to the question of how he can hide there, the answer was: "Ask Zhirinovskiy."

Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic were indicted last summer for serious war crimes after Bosnian Serb forces captured the UN safe areas around Zepa and Srebrenica and carried out the mass murder of at least 3,000 Bosnian Muslim men.

Since then they have also been indicted for previous mass killings, ethnic cleansing, raping, and plundering in both Krajina provinces and in northern Bosnia.

The War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague was set up following a UN resolution adopted well over two years ago to prosecute war criminals from both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

B-H: SBiH, Economic Prosperity Party Form Coalition

AU1906165696 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jun 96 p 4

[Article by L.J.: "Political Violence"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Party of Economic Prosperity of Bosnia-Herzegovina will, judging by everything, run at the forthcoming elections with the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina [SBiH]. As Party Secretary Safet

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Redzepagic stated at a news conference in Zenica, a general agreement on this has already been reached with SBiH President Dr. Haris Silajdzic and all that was left now was the signing of the agreement to appear jointly at the elections.

Speaking of the brutal attack on SBiH President Dr. Haris Silajdzic, the Party of Economic Prosperity of Bosnia-Herzegovina condemns most strenuously this act of political violence, which it was believed did not exist in our country. Unfortunately, such cases of brutal physical showdowns with the members of the opposition parties are not rare, their aim being to create a tense atmosphere that is supposed to demonstrate that the conditions for the holding of the elections in our country do not exist.

According to Redzepagic, Vinko Dusper, a member of the Executive Committee of the Party of Economic Prosperity, was attacked in Zavidovici on 11 June, when a group of hostile citizens completely demolished his office, which was decorated with the posters of the Party of Economic Prosperity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

B-H: Silajdzic's Party May Produce 'Schism' Among Bosniaks

96BA0285B Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 24 Apr 96 p 48

[Article by Dzemaludin Latic: "On the Threshold of a Schism!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *What Haris wants with the transparently emphasized multinational composition of his party—where the meaning of that mixture does not go beyond the meaning of the word "transparently" and it (the mixture) is becoming a formality, with an ulema whose positions I will write about separately—is most of all actually a frivolous attempt (whether real or simulated) to design a civil Bosnia-Herzegovina, but an attempt that could have very serious consequences for Bosniaks.*

The official appearance on the scene of Dr. Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the personnel with whom Silajdzic appeared at his party's convention, the political and ideological concept of that party, Silajdzic's statements abroad, the media campaign for him as a candidate for member of the future Presidency and for his party in (possible) future elections for parliament, etc., have introduced several serious misunderstandings among the Bosniak people. In the first place, there is the basic question of whether there will be a schism within that people and how it could end up, and then there is the question of what kind of Bosnia-Herzegovina Dr. Silajdzic is for, who his allies elsewhere in the world are, what they did for Bosnia-Herzegovina during the aggression, what they are promising, what they are for, and what and whom they and Haris Silajdzic are against in the country and in the world. Can one remain blind and deaf right now to the challenges that the former influential official politician of the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and the state authorities has offered to every Bosniak? Naturally one cannot!

Haris's political transformation is also accompanied by other uncertainties. For example, there is the question of whether elections will be held, under what conditions, and when, for the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament and Presidency. The OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] is supposed to adopt the electoral rules, and they are being persistently postponed. They have been announced for June. Mr. Mihajlo Mihajlov, who was recently interviewed in this newspaper, said that the international community had planned to force both the legal Bosnian government and the European countries in mid-summer to bring back as many refugees as possible precisely at that time. The difficult situation with thousands of demobilized soldiers, the disabled, the unemployed, refugees and displaced persons.... all of this, according to Mihajlov, who is really a top expert on international politics and especially U.S. politics, is leading to inevitable social rebellions, strikes, and demonstrations against the official authorities.

Side by side with these projections are the pressures of an ideological nature. President Izetbegovic is thus being asked (see, for example, the letter from Republican Dole) to determine "whether Bosnia belongs to the West or not" (a paraphrase of Dole's question). The ruling SDA is being accused of Islamization, which, according to the mentors behind these pressures, is a path to the destruction of democracy and a joint Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both of these types of pressures have an aim that is no longer being concealed: to overthrow the government of Alija Izetbegovic and remove him from the Bosnian political throne. When the foreign and domestic alliance is certain that it will achieve this goal, then it will organize elections and conduct them in accordance with its own desire and concept. Thus, DEUTSCHE WELLE, in its 16 April broadcast "in the Serbian and Croatian language," said: "There is no doubt that Washington is behind Silajdzic's decision to campaign against Izetbegovic in the elections."

In his response to Dole, President Izetbegovic said that the values which he, Dole, called Western ones, he, Izetbegovic, considered universal ones, and that this Bosnian and Bosniak people, as well as he personally, adhered to those values; and in his speech in Zenica last week he once again cited the "tripod" in foreign policy,

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referring to reliance upon the United States, Europe, and the Islamic world.

How can a reasonable and fair person, after the sufferings in Bosnia, agree to the elimination of the policy that organized the defense and fought against the genocidal Greater-Serbian (Milosevic's) and Greater-Croatian (Tudjman's) concepts and their armies? It should be clearly stated that an intention dangerous to the Bosniak people—equating the butchers and their victims—lies behind that kind of political pragmatism that destroys one's own principles. Who can consent to that kind of equation?! What would be the consequences of that sick and shameful action, the well-known symmetry that equates the Bosniak resistance with the Chetnik and Ustasha movements?

More important than anything else is the following: If Alija Izetbegovic's policy were to be overthrown here, the door to the elimination of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state and of the political identity of the Bosniak people would quite certainly be thrown wide open, and it would be completely uncertain what political force could halt that kind of dangerous development in the situation.

DEUTSCHE WELLE (which I have reason to quote, because it hits upon the essence of the projected future of Bosnia-Herzegovina) claimed in the same broadcast: "Silajdzic wants to draw a line of demarcation between the adherents of war and the population that still aspires to a multinational and multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina. Primarily people from mixed marriages belong to that group; they constitute 25 percent of the population and have to be afraid of further Islamization, especially in the interior of the country and especially in central Bosnia.... Izetbegovic's challenger, Silajdzic, can count not only on the Muslim political opposition, like the former reform Communists, but also on the generation of young and European-oriented Muslims. They could achieve contact more easily with similarly oriented Croats and Serbs."

If one looks at the list of founders of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, it will be seen that it actually is a party of mixed marriages. Specifically, most of the non-Muslims in this party are in mixed marriages, just as Haris Silajdzic's ideologue and chief consultant, Kasim Sabrihafizovic (and several other people whose biographies would not be known to me if they themselves did not extol their private happiness) lived and is still living in a mixed marriage. (This Sabrihafizovic is also the son of the former really prominent imam of the Beg Mosque, and is a person from whom the Young Muslims fled like the plague under communism.) Next, it is a party of the dissatisfied and the careerists (some of them, Pamuk, etc., are changing their party for the third time; a certain Lependa is a member of five parties in Sarajevo; others have been promised ambassadorial positions). Ultimately, all of these are private reasons and they are not essential. What is essential is the following: If people from mixed marriages have—and in a democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina they really must have—equal rights with the absolute majority of this population which rejected that private path, can they, together with their world mentors who are instructing them in democracy, create a Bosnia-Herzegovina according to their own model, while overlooking the majority's rights? Can one impose on the Bosniak Muslim people a future from the past in which the names Zaklin, Alen, Goran, Zlatan, Vesna..."flourished" in Muslim houses, and in which they were a people without color, taste, or scent, like distilled water? What Haris wants with these people, with the transparently emphasized multinational composition of his party—where the meaning of this "mixture" does not go beyond the meaning of the word "transparently" and it (the mixture) becomes a formality, with an ulema whose positions I will write about separately—it is first of all actually a frivolous attempt (whether real or simulated) to design a civil Bosnia-Herzegovina, but an attempt that could have very serious consequences for Bosniaks. Above all, a democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina is only possible with people defined as Muslims and Bosniaks, who have proven their feeling for justice and coexistence at the time of the genocide against this people. A democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina is not possible without people likewise defined as Catholics, Orthodox, and Jews—Bosnian ones, i.e., those who are not seeking a different state within an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is thus only with that kind of fully realized nations that it is possible to create a healthy civil state. That kind of concept is logical, certain, and optimal for all the peoples in Bosnia, and thus for the Muslim Bosniak people as well. Haris's concept is uncertain and absolutely unacceptable to the people that is fully proving itself in its state-creating nature and its ethnic and religious identity! That suffering (Bosniak) people, which came to awareness in catastrophic conditions, is not even mentioned on a single page in the statute of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina!

I feel obligated, since I became familiar with Dr. Silajdzic and his views and colleagues, to warn that he has nevertheless led that Bosniak people to the brink of a schism! He or someone else may interpret that as my partisan bias, but let the arguments be verified, and let us wait to see what is brought by the times ahead. I am just afraid that it may be too late! Specifically, in this Muslim people, which before the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina subtly reconciled tradition and modern challenges, sentiment and political rationalism, there

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may be a sharp polarization (as in Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt) between the so-called modern, European forces and the Islamic ones, which Silajdzic's agitprop is already calling fundamentalist. (A certain Backovic, an officer, is already accusing both the Patriotic League and the SDA of "linking us with Iran instead of the West!") Is it really necessary, after the genocide and the embargo and so many democratic tricks from the West in connection with Bosnia and Bosniaks, even to interpret such superficial and stupid views?

Finally, the convention of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina has already demonstrated the mental profile of its leader, who, in a special documentary, boasted of his international connections, handshakes, smiles.... This was an attempt—taught by the Titoist tradition—to create a pure cult of personality, which he is attributing to the SDA and its leader—without whom Haris Silajdzic would only be known on slatki coset [expression unknown].

B-H: Zubak Denies Deal With Ganic on Herzeg-Bosnia Dissolution

AU2006190396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1718 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today denied that he had reached a "gentlemen's" agreement with Ejup Ganic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation vice president, according to which Jadranko Prlic would be appointed Bosnia-Herzegovina foreign minister under the condition that the Herzeg-Bosnia government was abolished, ONASA reports.

"The talks and agreements on the top duties in the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina were all conducted and made in Dayton, and were generally concluded between people negotiating on behalf of the Bosniak and Croat people. Ejup Ganic was not in Dayton," says the statement from the office of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation president.

The statement says that "the representatives of the Croat people have never made deals under threat, and particularly not when it is the case of state functions to which the Croat people have an inalienable right."

"The manner in which the agreement was reached for Prlic to be appointed foreign minister is known to the people that participated in the talks (in Dayton). Owing to the possible misinterpretation of information from those talks, and out of respect for the principles of diplomatic discretion and the people involved in the agreement, these facts are not being made available for publication," Zubak's statement says.

B-H: Zubak Blames Muslims for Federation's Political Stalemate

LD2006140296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1347 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 20 (TANJUG)—President of the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina Kresimir Zubak has rejected accusations by Muslim authorities that the forming of a new government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia is a step backward in efforts to breathe life into the federation.

Zubak, a Croat, blamed the Muslim side for the blockade of federal institutions because it withholds consent from the proposed federal defence law.

Federation Vice-President Ejup Ganic, a Muslim, and Muslim members of the constituent assembly on Wednesday strongly protested against the forming of the new Herzeg-Bosnia government, seeing it as a blow to federal institutions.

Zubak said in a statement on Thursday that the Croat side had not formed a new Herzeg-Bosnia government but only reduced the existing cabinet, leaving only the ministries that did not exist on the federal level.

Zubak said that the decision on forming a new cabinet was in accordance with the pace of building the federation, and added that only six of the former 14 ministries had remained because they were vital for the functioning of institutions.

Parliament deputies of three opposition parties tried to settle the dispute between the federal partners by demanding that Zubak and Ganic be dismissed, but the constituent assembly has not yet taken the vote.

The assembly instructed Zubak and Ganic to prepare a new coordinated report on the situation in the federation for the next assembly session because their previous speeches had been greatly contradictory.

The Muslim-Croat federation was formed in March 1994 under Washington's pressure.

Before that, Bosnian Muslims and Croats had been engaged in a brutal one-year war over territories in Bosnia.

Their federation, however, has hardly begun to function to this day because of constant bickering between the federal partners.

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B-H: SDA Supports Request for Prlic's Dismissal

LD2006221996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA; ruling Bosnian Muslim party] today, the party's secretary general, Mirsad Ceman, said among other things that the SDA supported Ejup Ganic's [Bosnian presidency member and Muslim-Croat federation's vice president] request for the dismissal of [Croat] Jadranko Prlic, foreign minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who, Ceman says, should have informed the federation leaders about the revival of the government of so-called Herzeg-Bosnia.

B-H: Herzeg-Bosnia Authority 'Direct Violation' of Peace Accord

AU2006161996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Jun 96

[Report by Nada al-Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] The most recent events in the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia are an expression of separatist tendencies on the part of some Herzegovina Croats. This is the only way one can interpret the renewal of the government of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia, Alexander Ivanko, UN spokesman for Bosnia-Herzegovina, said. The United Nations will therefore demand that the Republic of Croatia, as a signatory of the Dayton agreement and patron of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats, exert influence on them not to destroy Dayton or all other agreements about peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because, he said, the resumption of the Herzeg-Bosnia government is a direct violation of the Dayton agreement.

Ivanko also complained about the poor cooperation that the Croatian police in Bosnia-Herzegovina has with the UN forces. He said that the UN will therefore request replacement of the police chief in Livno, because, as Ivanko claims, he lied to the UN police, who had information that the Croatian police had arrested six [number as received] Serbs in Livno and then transported them to the prison in [words indistinct]. However, the Livno police chief would give absolutely no information to the UN military police.

As yet another great problem threatening peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ivanko cited the fact that people indicted for war crimes are still in power in the Serb Republic. Their influence is, he said, still very strong, which represents a threat to lasting peace and to the future elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Vice President Ganic Addresses Assembly

AU1906142296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0919 GMT 19 Jun 96

[Address by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo on 19 June, on Point 33 of the agenda about the situation in the Federation—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ganic] I was asked recently how I would define the federation in brief terms, when this extensive problem is concerned. Then I said that some 100 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's problems were found on 51 percent of its territory, and that all the problems which afflict the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, its integrity, were found on the territory of the Federation. Therefore, the state of affairs in the Federation is as it is today. It is difficult, and it is primarily characterized by the situation in the sphere of human rights. The state of human rights is a reason for concern. The norms of respect and observance of human rights, which have been signed, [word indistinct], and is a factual state on which I have already briefed you.

The second problem is the reinstitution of lawfulness at all levels, and this is a general occurrence, of which we are aware. Otherwise, how [illegible] we to explain that the legally elected chairman of a municipality, elected by the Federation [word indistinct], cannot perform his duties, which means he is not allowed to be in the municipality that elected him its chairman?

Third, the issue of private property [words indistinct] is the cornerstone of the reorganization of the state in terms of the development of market economy, foreign investment, and respect for lawfulness. Consequently, the violation of private property is a reason for concern, in other words, private property is not observed in the other part of the Federation. I have stated that [word indistinct] in my report. The very facts that the state of human rights is not satisfactory, that the law is not being observed, and that private property is endangered, results in a considerable slowdown of refugees' return to their homes, with little progress, indeed, which is a very worrisome situation. Thus, a surplus of [words indistinct], when refugees are concerned. We have tried to [words indistinct], actually, it is in Dayton when we agreed upon the project involving four cities, and you know what the problems are, and who did what. You know what happened on the ground. However, we must not stop at this stage, we have to work further. The parliament is here to adopt [word indistinct] laws, and some adopted laws are not being implemented, unfortunately. Particularly disputed is the Defense Act, and we expect this act to be almost completed, because

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when we deal with laws, attitudes of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, under which jurisdiction is the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and those of the president and the vice president of the Federation, need to be harmonized. The Defense Act was discussed in Washington, and some key articles, which refer to the future structure of the Army and a time span needed for its integration, were agreed on, and what was signed in Washington by Mr. Zubak and myself is still valid and is not disputable in the further process of the debate and the development of the act.

On the territory of the Federation, activities by political parties are a particular problem. Not all of those political parties are [words indistinct] for activities on the entire territory of the Federation. This endangers the possibility of holding elections, and this endangers elementary democratic principles. Of course, this [words indistinct] and this primarily refers to the territory under the control of the Croatian Defense Council.

Here, in the Assembly, laws are devised. You, being the highest legislative body, coordinate laws and regulations, and it is agreement reached within this body on which depends what regulations and laws will be passed. We are waiting for the bill on insignia to be passed, we are waiting for many other laws to be passed, and I think that you should complete this process according to a precise [word indistinct]. Cantons have been formed, and this issue moves forward somehow. Basically, in these two cantons, namely, the West Herzegovina canton and the other one, I am not sure what it is called, the western one or something like that, which is the one stretching from Drvar toward Livno, the situation has still not been consolidated. I expect representatives of the Croatian people to create an absolute majority to complete the process there [as received]. However, a reason for concern in the Federation is a difficult economic situation. Certain things have improved—the freedom of movement, trade—so that the private initiative, at least in the manner it has been anticipated by legal [word indistinct], has made prices acceptable in much of the Federation. However, we still have a difficult situation with the great number of demobilized soldiers, pensioners, who are not able to pay costs of living, that is, rents and the like, from their pensions. We have an unsatisfactory situation regarding teachers, professors, doctors, and other segments of society in general. In this respect, both governments ought to make additional efforts to improve the situation speedily. Yesterday, while I was preparing this report, although I forwarded to you the report on the situation as early as a week ago, but this week I was on a visit to a friendly country, and I saw on CNN that the government of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia has been reshuffled, that is, formed again, and that Mr. Markovic has been appointed prime minister of that government. This is a huge step backward, because, as you know, the condition for our moving forward is the abolition of that government, and within the same package functions were redistributed at the level of the republic and the federation, and one of the most important functions in the state, that of foreign minister, was given to a representative of the Croatian people, and we wanted to satisfy precisely him, because he was the first prime minister of Herzeg-Bosnia, and thereby motivate him to dedicate himself a little more to the state as a whole. After the news that that government has been reshuffled, I checked with the Foreign Ministry [word indistinct], and [word indistinct], just like our friends who immediately rushed to ask what had happened, [words indistinct], and I really reproach the Foreign Ministry for [words indistinct], and Mr. Prlic for not informing the members of the Contact Group and the world public earlier of this event, which I consider to be very negative as far as the Federation is concerned. Therefore, I would not repeat what I stated in my report, because people say the worst thing is to read out your own report (?before others) after seven days, but I have to tell you that we will have to intensify the cooperation with the members of the Contact Group, with the Forum of the Federation that is chaired by Americans, with Messrs. Bildt and Steiner, and we will have to demand intensification of the IFOR [Implementation Force] presence on the territory of the Federation, and its help, because a lot of segments are not functioning as they should. However, there is progress, and a lot has been done and improved, but unfortunately, that is not enough. I always ask [words indistinct] to follow him. However, the Federation, in the minds of individuals, is still generating some thoughts about an integral Bosnia. I have always, just like the majority, felt about the Federation, which I always will, as one of the key levers for the preservation of an integral Bosnia. We have accepted arbitration, and, unfortunately, some of its results are not being observed, but I have to tell you that the more arbitration there is, the more limited the sovereignty of the Bosnia-Herzegovina legal authorities will be, in a way, and in certain domains. In the material that I have handed you I have [word indistinct] stated which domains those are, what is not functioning and where, and where human rights are not being observed, because the observance of human rights is the basic precondition for our integration into the world community, the economic and political [word indistinct]. I have to tell you that I have spent a lot of time in the field. That is hazardous and difficult. I have made a lot of efforts to ensure [word indistinct] for those political parties which [words indistinct] and (?which was) difficult. Those contacts with people give another dimension to problems,

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they reveal things, and I would propose that representatives of political parties take part in such tours as often as they can to see what the situation is in the field, because, especially now, with the elections approaching, we have to endeavor to be present everywhere. I have made great efforts to compel the administrations of the Untied States and Germany to get more intensively involved in the Federation, and I have to tell you we have received a lot of help, and I am further trying to compel the international community as much as possible to help us in building the Federation. On this matter, honorable deputies, you have received the material that I passed out to you. That is a long subject, with many chapters, and each of them can be discussed, but my goal was to initiate a debate, to provide an insight into [word indistinct] methods and ways, and [word indistinct] is better. This much for now, and thank you for your attention.

B-H: Three Parties Urge Removal of Zubak, Ganic

LD2006145796 Tuzla Radio Tuzla in Serbo Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Three opposition parties have proposed to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's parliament that proceedings be launched for the dismissal of Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, because of their inability to breathe life into the federation.

The Social-Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, and the Muslim Bosniak Organization have demanded that the federation's leaders be dismissed because they have failed to adhere to signed agreements on the federation.

Zubak and Ganic have acted as if they are responsible only to their own parties—the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] and the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], and have disowned the federation's parliament, the opposition demand says.

The opposition demand says the federation's leaders are not the only ones to blame for failings in the implementation of agreements on the federation, but they have never named those who are subordinate to them and who have failed to carry out their tasks. This is not an attack on personalities but an attempt to take a step forward in the implementation of agreements on the federation, the demand by the three opposition parties says.

B-H: HVO General on Federation Army Prospects

AU2006150296 Sarajevo HRVATSKA RIJEC in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jun 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Major General Filip Filipovic, commander of the Joint Army Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO, by Ana Havel and Zlatko Tulic; place and date not given: "The Federation Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina Will Carry On With the Same Intensity That the Federation Will Carry On"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Major General Filip Filipovic, commander of the Joint Army Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], was born in Travnik, where he completed high school, the very same school for which, they say, a battle is being waged to keep it as it was. Having successfully completed his studies at the military academy, he served in the army as a commander of an armored division. When war broke out, he was in Sarajevo, where he remained until 10 April 1992, after which he took part in defending central Bosnia. There were many battles, experiences, and misfortunes. He claims that he is the greatest winner of all, because "it is hard to believe all the things that I went through and stayed 'in one piece.' That too was an achievement." We talked with Gen. Filipovic at the Joint Army Staff premises in Sarajevo.

The Defense Law and the Joint Army Staff

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] The Constituent Assembly has still not passed the defense law, although at its last session there was discussion on the differing views in two articles of the law. Minister Soljic has presented his views at a press conference. What is your opinion about these issues, since you, as a leading HVO official on the Joint Army Staff in Sarajevo, are actively involved in making this important law?

[Filipovic] Minister Soljic has made a public announcement about the defense law and there is nothing more that I would add except that the HVO takes the same positions that Minister Soljic has presented. All kinds of agreements and arrangements are possible, but there are some basic conditions: A component cannot be lost, because it exists de facto and de jure and no attempts will be accepted in that sense. Second, we are protecting our people from being indicted for not serving in the army in a unit that is not, nor can in any way be, their own, especially when their lifes are at stake, and there could be many such situations. In that sense, the law must say that army service must be done, but in ways such as we have created in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We do not mind if a Bosniak Muslim from Livno, Tomislavgrad, Mostar,

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Capljina, or anywhere else he might live does his military service in the army, which we allowed during the war, but we are asking for the same for Croats.

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] We are particularly interested in that part of the defense arrangements that deals with the Joint Staff. How should it function and are there any problems in your present negotiations?

[Filipovic] Now the focus is on the defense law. That is the overall framework. The concept of the Joint Staff would be in the small print. There are no significant differences between us as to what the Joint Staff, or Joint Command should look like. That is clear and, under the influence of the West, we are attempting to keep this body from being overly large and to keep it as compact and efficient as possible, and we will act accordingly when the time comes. That refers to a future joint staff. Currently, the Joint Staff has to some extent been deliberately sidelined, because the problem-solving has been left to the civilian sector, in other words, the ministry, and also because the army treats such a joint staff as an agreement between the two sides, the army and the HVO, and the American side has no decisive influence here. Actually, the American side is trying to augment, while the army side is trying to diminish, the significance of the Joint Staff, until a Federation army is created.

The Americans...

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] You mentioned the role of the United States. The defense structure was agreed upon in Washington. How do you see the role of the Americans in solving problems and what is their current position on this issue?

[Filipovic] The Americans are the main factor and there is no doubt about that. The decisions, or solutions, that they propose are primary even compared with Europe. It is a fact, especially while their forces are here, these 20,000 American soldiers, that implementation will go the way in which they want it. However, the Americans are endeavoring to adapt local political solutions and relations to the situation and they are very pragmatic in that sense. So, when they seek an agreement, they want all the sides to accept it as their own and then they insist upon it. That some things are not going the way in which they had planned is only because they have not perceived them to the fullest extent. On the other hand, the complete implementation of the Dayton agreement, particularly its civilian part, is not going well. Things are too complex and the deadlines too short. As far as a solution here in Bosnia is concerned, the Americans will have, in fact they already have, a primary role and they will carry this through in the way in which they wish and see fit. Particularly critical is this period leading up to their elections. They will probably avoid hasty measures, but it is certain that they do have a permanent course of action for resolving the situation, which is not the best solution for the Croats, though it is acceptable.

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] Do you think that the Americans will remain here after their one-year mandate expires?

[Filipovic] They will remain for sure, only not with the forces that they have now and not as many, because there is no need for it. I even think that in this situation military solutions do not require such forces and they will probably be reduced. But they will certainly remain in this area in some form or another, just as the Russians will, for that matter. This is because the Russians or countries of the former Soviet Union are equally represented in some form and they are also sure to remain here.

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] When do you think that the final decision will be made? After the elections in the United States?

[Filipovic] After all, they set the one-year deadline themselves. They will probably lay down some other formula and some other deadlines in the same way.

Zubak or Izetbegovic for the Interim Period

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] In resolving issues of defense in the Federation, the Joint Staff will be playing a more significant role. Are you prepared to carry out this task in terms of organization, personnel, and every other way?

[Filipovic] People may have an erroneous impression about the Joint Staff. It played a greater role during the war in central and western Bosnia. Now it is of somewhat lesser importance. It is certain that we are not what is expected of the Joint Staff. If personnel from the General Staff were coopted, in other words, incorporated onto the Joint Staff, then the Joint Staff would have a role. The Joint Staff, therefore, should be regarded not as it is now, but as it should be.

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] In that context, tell us something about Mr. Izetbegovic as commander in chief of the army and Mr. Zubak as commander of the HVO, as the press has recently been writing.

[Filipovic] This is a formulation for the interim period, until the elections and the final solution. We have agreed to that because this is de facto and de jure the present situation. The army is under Izetbegovic's command and the HVO is under Zubak's. This could be included into the defense law, but this is that kind of civilian political component over the army, without diminishing what the president and the vice president of the Federation are

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according to the Washington and Dayton agreements. So actually, this is only for an interim period, since the army side insists exclusively on it. Therefore, this is yet another compromise, a concession by the Croatian side to which we agreed in order to avoid jeopardizing Croatian interests.

We Are Capable of Defending the Federation and Bosnia-Herzegovina

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] How do you see the Federation army and its functioning, particularly the HVO as a separate component? We would like your personal as well as professional view.

[Filipovic] The Federation army exists even now as the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO. In that sense, with some changes and adjustments, it will continue in the same way. So, there is to be no disappearance of one component or the other, but we need to find ways for them to maintain close relations. What I think as a professional is that some branches of the army that are smaller or more highly specialized and, therefore, require greater financial resources, will be united. However, most of the army will retain its traditions, of course not under the same names, and here there will be the large amount of time, the many years spent in the war, because no side will abandon the experiences and achievements gained during the war. All of this is possible, provided that we understand the reality of peace, that peace has to be built and in that peace, the Federation army.

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] Is the Federation army capable of defending the Federation's territory?

[Filipovic] Speaking from a professional point of view, not only is the Federation army capable of defending its territory, but it can also beat the aggressor, provided that it acts together to achieve a common goal, much as we did in the last months of 1995. So, in terms of numbers, training, experience and, yes, even equipment (in spite of its condition and that it is not up to Western standards, the men have become accustomed to it), the Federation army is capable of defending the Federation. It is capable of defending Bosnia-Herzegovina, assuming there is no international blockade and provided that the army of the Bosnian Serb Republic is not helped, as it was during the war, by the so-called Yugoslav Army. So again there could be no military successes, because during last summer and autumn they effectively did not have the forces to withstand the forces that were carrying out the attack.

Train and Equip

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] When will the implementation of the "Train and Equip" agreement begin?

[Filipovic] Here the Americans have set a condition: the passing of the defense law. In the meantime there have been some forms of "Train and Equip": Some army personnel have been training in Turkey. Whether this has been with the knowledge and approval of the Americans, I do not know, but it seems that it will not be able to continue if the Americans keep insisting on passing the defense law and on the train and equip program. The fact is that the deadlines are tight because the Americans would like to do something to equip the Federation army before IFOR [Implementation Force] withdraws or they themselves leave, to make sure politically and militarily that they will not be leaving a situation worse than when they came. I believe that these are long-term activities and that the army and the HVO are slowly coming together, in terms of acting, training, equipment, etc. I look at this as a process that will ultimately bring something better, above all, an orientation toward a Western view of defense activities. But it does not mean that these people who undergo a short period of military training will essentially improve the quality of either the HVO or the army.

[HRVATSKA RIJEC] Are there concrete solutions for this train and equip program?

[Filipovic] There is no concrete program. At least I do not know where those weapons are or where they will come from. Clearly, their destination is the Federation, the Republic of Croatia, Turkey, and some other NATO destinations—I am referring to those forces that will be undergoing the training program. So much for "train." As for equip, how much of that there will be depends on the signatures in Oslo and Vienna. I believe that the Americans have already prepared part of this, because for them, being a large country, it is no problem. [passage omitted]

B-H: Amendments to Federation Constitution

LD1106193696 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1030 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Punctuation and capitalization as received]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of Article VIII.1. (3), and in connection with Articles IX.1. and IX.3. (1) and (2) of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at its ———— session held ———— 1996 [as received] adopted AMENDMENTS II-XXV to the CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA.

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AMENDMENT II: The preamble to the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended to read: "Convinced that the democratic institutions based on the respect of human rights and freedoms are best placed to form a harmonious relation between them and their communities, Rejecting the violence of war, Wishing to contribute to the enhancement of peace, Wishing to promote the freedom of the individual and the free market, Guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and Global Framework Agreement on Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its annexes [Opci Okvirni Sporazum], the people and citizens of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is a constituent part of the sovereign state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, resolute in their wish to ensure full equality betweeen nations, democratic relations and the highest standards of human rights and freedoms, are hereby adopting the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

AMENDMENT III: Article 1.1. of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended to read: "(1) Bosniaks and Croats as constituent nations, together with the others, and the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the territories of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, exercising their sovereign rights, are transforming the territorial organization of the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as defined by Annex II of the Global Framework Agreement, so that the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of federal units with equal rights and responsibilities.

"(2) The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the two entities constituting the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and has all the powers, authority and responsibilities which are not defined by the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as being excusively in the jurisdiction of Bosnia-Herzegovina institutions."

AMENDMENT IV: Article II.A.1. of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended to read: "As the principles, rights, and freedoms which have been been set out in Article II of the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina are being applied throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following provisons relate to the Federation."

AMENDMENT V: Paragraph 1., Article II., A., 2., of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended in its first sentence to read:

"The federation will secure the implementation of the highest level of internationally recognized rights and freedoms as defined in documents listed in the Addendum of the Constitution."

AMENDMENT VI: Article II., A., 4., of the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended to read:

"In line with Annex VII of the Global Framework Agreement, all persons have the right to reclaim the property they were deprived of during the ethnic persecution and hostilities which began in 1991, as well as compensation for all the property which cannot be returned to them. All statements and commitments made and undertook under coercion, particularly those in connection with renunciation of land rights and other property rights, are invalid.

"The federal legislation will regulate the realization of rights envisaged by Paragraph 1 of the article."

AMENDMENT VII: Article II., A., 5., of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended to read:

The federal legislation will regulate the ways to secure or lose the citizenship of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the following conditions:

a) No one can be stripped of citizenship arbitrarily or in a way which would leave one stateless.

b) No one can be stripped of citizenship of the federation because of sex, race, color, language, political or other beliefs, ethnic or social origin, being a member of an ethnic minority, wealth, place of birth, or any other characteristic.

c) In line with the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, all citizens of the federation are also citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and have the right to citizenship of another state depending on conditions for citizenship determined by the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

AMENDMENT VIII: Article III., 1., of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended to read:

"The federation has exclusive competence over:

"a) Organizing and conducting the defense of the federation, protection of its territory—including setting up a joint command of all military forces in the federation, supervision of military production, signing of military agreements in line with the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and cooperation with the permanent committee for military issues and the council of ministers in the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"b) Nationality of the federation.

"c) Drawing up economic policy, including planning and reconstruction, and the land use policy at the federal level.

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"d) This issue has not been agreed upon.

"e) Adoption of regulations on finances and financial institutions of the federation and the fiscal policy of the federation.

"f) Eradication of terrorism, intercantonal crime, unauthorized drug trafficking, and organized crime.

"g) Allocation of electronic frequencies for radio, TV, and other purposes, in accordance with the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"h) Drawing up energy policy, including distribution between the cantons and maintaining the necessary infrastructure.

"i) Financing the operation of federal authorities and institutions which are set up by the federal government through taxation, borrowing or other means."

AMENDMENT IX: Article III., 2., of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, text under d) and g) is amended to read:

"D) Communication and traffic infrastructure, in accordance with the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"g) Implementation of the law on nationality and other relevant regulations and travel documents of citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina living in the federation, and on the sojourn and movement of foreigners."

AMENDMENT X: Article IV., A., 20., of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, under f) is amended to read:

"f) authorizing the cantons to conclude agreements with states and international organizations, with the agreement of the parliamentary assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, apart from those agreements which have been exempted by the parliamentary assembly as not requiring such agreement."

Text under g) is deleted.

Text under h) is amended to read:

"H) Endorsing by a majority of votes the agreements with states and international organizations, with the previous agreement of the parliamentary assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, apart from those agreements which have been exempted by the parliamentary assembly as not requiring such agreement."

AMENDMENT XI: Article IV., B., 1., of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended to read:

"The president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina represents the federation and is the head of federal executive authorities."

AMENDMENT XII: Article IV., B., 4., of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended to read:

"The government of the federation consists of a prime minister, who is the head of the government, a deputy prime minister, and ministers. All ministers have deputies, and not a single deputy, including the deputy prime minister, can be a member of the same constituent nation as the minister in question."

AMENDMENT XIII: Text a)(V) of Article IV., B., 7., of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended to read:

The text under a)(V) is amended to read

"A)(V) the signing and ratification of international agreements on behalf of the federation."

The text under a)(VI) is deleted.

The text under d) is deleted.

The text under c)(I) is amended to read:

"C)(I) discharges ministerial duties."

THE TEXT OF AMENDMENT XIII UNDER a)(I) and a)(II) HAS NOT BEEN AGREED UPON.

AMENDMENT XIV: THIS AMENDMENT HAS NOT BEEN AGREED UPON.

AMENDMENT XV: New points c) and d) are added to Article C.3 10 (1) of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Previous Points c) and d) become Points e) and f).

"C) between a town and its canton or federal authorities;

"d) between a municipality and a town;"

The text under 10 (2) d) is amended to read:

"D) at the request of the prime minister, deputy prime minister, or the relevant cantonal president determines whether a draft regulation or a regulation adopted by cantonal, town, or municipal authorities is in line with the constitution."

AMENDMENT XVI: Article V., 1., 2., of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is amended to read:

"(1) Every canton may transfer its authority to a municipality or town on its territory, or to federal authorities.

"(2) Every canton may transfer to a municipality or town its authority concerning education, culture, tourism, local business activities, charity organizations, radio, and TV, and is obliged to do so if the majority

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population of the municipality or town is not the majority population in the canton as a whole.

"(3) Every canton may conclude agreements with states and international organizations with the previous consent of the federal parliament and the parliamentary assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, apart from agreements exempted by the parliamentary assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina as not requiring its consent."

AMENDMENT XVII: In the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina the following chapter is added after chapter "VI., Municipal Authorities."

"V.A. TOWN AUTHORITIES (1) In areas of two or more municipalities, which are linked by towns or territory and by the everyday needs of the population, the town as the unit of local administration and self-administration should be set up in accordance with federal law.

"Responsibilities of the town are:

"a) Finances and taxation policy in accordance with federal and cantonal laws;

"b) Joint infrastructure;

"c) Urban planning;

"d) Public transport;

"e) Other responsibilities entrusted to the town by the canton, or transferred to the town by the municipality.

"(2) The town has its statute which must be in accordance with this constitution, the constitution of the canton and cantonal laws.

"(3) The town has a town council which has the same number of councillors from each municipality; the number of councillors, the procedure for their election, and the duration of their mandate is established in the statute.

"The town council can have between 15 and 30 councillors.

"(4) The town council:

"a) Draws up and adopts the town statute by a two-thirds majority;

"b) Elects the mayor;

"c) Endorses the town budget;

"d) Endorses regulations for discharging transferred responsibilities and other responsibilities stipulated in the statute.

"(5) The mayor's responsibilities are:

"a) Appointing and replacing town officials;

"b) Implementating town policy and enforcing town regulations;

"c) Ensuring cooperation between town officials and ombudsmen;

"d) Submitting reports to the city council and to the public on the conduct of city policy.

"e) Ensuring that the city generates revenue through taxation, loans, and in other legal ways."

AMENDMENT XVIII: Article VII.1 of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is altered and reads:

"International relations pertaining to the federation must be in keeping with the international status, territorial integrity, and continuity of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

AMENDMENT XIX: Article VII.3 of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is altered and reads:

"International treaties and other agreements in force in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the federation, and the general rules of international law, are part of the law pertaining to the federation. Where there is failure to harmonize an international treaty or agreement with this law, the international treaty or agreement takes precedence."

AMENDMENT XX: Article VII.4 of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is altered and reads:

"(1) Agreements with states and international organizations are signed and ratified on behalf of the federation by the president of the federation. They take effect in the federation only if they are approved by the federation's parliament and with prior agreement of the parliamentary assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, except when the federation's parliament or the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly has a law stating that such agreement is not necessary for these kinds of international agreement.

"(2) The president of the federation, on the advice of the prime minister, can annul international agreements if he or she is allowed to do so by the parliamentary assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he or she is obliged to act in this way when so requested by the federation's parliament in agreement with or at the request of the parliamentary assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

AMENDMENT XXI: Article IX.2. (1) c) of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is deleted.

AMENDMENT XXII: Article IX.4 (1) of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is altered and reads:

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"(1) The first elections for the Chamber of Deputies, the People's Chamber, cantonal legislative bodies, and municipal councils shall be held in keeping with Annex III of the Global Framework Agreement.

"Later elections will take place in accordance with electoral laws passed by the federation's parliament."

The wording of (5) is altered and reads:

"(3) No person who is serving a sentence passed by the international court for former Yugoslavia nor any person charged by the international court for former Yugoslavia and who does not appear before the court at its request, may stand as candidate for or hold an appointed, elected, or any other post in the territory of the federation."

AMENDMENT XXIII: Article IX.10 of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is altered and reads:

"This constitution is applied in the municipalities of the city of Mostar and in Mostar city while it is under the administration of the European Union, unless decided otherwise by the EU administrator, who may not depart from Chapter II on human rights and basic liberties. During the period of EU administration, the president of the federation consults with the administrator with regard to facilitating the full application of this constitution in the city of Mostar as soon as this period terminates."

AMENDMENT XXIV: Article IX.11 of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is altered and reads:

"(1) The Constituent Assembly of the federation, which is composed of deputies to the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina elected in 1990, continues with its work until the constitution of the parliament of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in accordance with Annex III and IV of the Global Framework Agreement.

"(2) In the period until the constitution of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in accordance with Annex III and IV of the Global Framework Agreement, the civilian command of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the appointment of army officers, will be carried out by the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the civilian command of the Croat Defense Council [HVO], including the appointment of army officers, will be carried out by the president or vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina who is of Croat nationality.

"(3) Until the federal, cantonal, and municipal officials are elected, in the transitional period, in accordance with Article IX.3, the current administrative arrangements will remain in force within the federation, except in the municipalities of the city of Mostar and Mostar city which will be under the administration of the EU administrator for the period agreed between the EU and the president or vice president of the federation."

AMENDMENT XXV: In the Addendum to the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina after Point 21 a new point is added which reads:

"22. The general convention on the protection of national minorities of 1994."

B-H: Mostar Administration Spokesman Views Elections

AU2006184496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar refugees in Germany, Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden will be allowed to vote in these countries in the forthcoming elections for local bodies in the city, Dragan Gasic, spokesman to the EU Administration in Mostar, said at today's news conference. He pointed out that the EU is not organizing the local elections in Mostar and that this is the task of the local Bosniak and Croat authorities. We are going to give financial and logistical support to these elections. We are also going to establish a special commission to supervise the elections, which is going to be completely independent, Gasic said. He said that representatives of the sides in Mostar had expressed the desire to organize bus lines from Germany and other West European countries so that refugees could vote in Mostar. Speaking about the voting of refugees in Western countries, Gasic said that refugees in Germany would be able to vote only if they are in that country, which means that the refugees who are currently in other European countries would not be able to vote in Germany.

The situation in Switzerland is different. Its government will allow refugees from France, Austria, and Italy to vote in Bern if these countries guarantee that after voting, the refugees will return there, Gasic said. He added that the Italian Government has already obligated itself to have refugees return and that similar decisions are expected of France and Austria.

Gasic said that the Croatian authorities in western Mostar announced that they are not going to organize buses for refugees and that Croats will vote in Mostar or in Bonn. The Croats who want to come to Mostar to vote will organize their trip at their own cost, he added. He also said that the EU Administration will pay for all the costs of bus lines organized for Mostar from European countries.

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According to the Dayton agreement, only those people who are currently in the city can vote at the Mostar elections. However, after many protests, agreement was reached that refugees can nevertheless vote.

Gasic pointed out that the voting of Serb refugees has remained the greatest problem as according to the 1991 census, about 23,000 Serbs lived in Mostar and now there are only about 3,000. He said that it was primarily envisaged that following the elections, the City Assembly will consist of 16 Bosniaks, 16 Croats, and 16 representatives of the others, mainly Serbs. However, after it was established that most Serbs will not be able to vote, it was agreed that the category of others should have only five representatives in the City Assembly.

However, I must stress that the most important result of the elections will be that Mostar will again become a unified city, Gasic said.

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Croatia: Tudjman Satisfied With Visit to Turkey

LD2006215896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, returned to Zagreb this evening after a two-day official visit to Turkey. Our reporter Zoltan Kabok was at Zagreb airport.

[Kabok] [Passage omitted] Commenting on his two-day visit to Turkey, President Tudjman said the following in a brief statement:

[Begin Tudjman recording] I think we can be satisfied with the talks I had with President Demirel and the talks the state delegation had with the Turkish delegation, as well as the defense ministers' talks. We can also be satisfied with the agreements. There is considerable potential, especially in the economy, for our companies such as [electronics factory Rade] Koncar and [pharmaceutical factory] Pliva to conclude long-term business deals. We can be very satisfied, especially those of us who visited ancient Ephesus for the first time. That was very interesting. Thank you. [end recording]

Croatia: Deputy Prime Minister on East Slavonia Demands

LD2006224796 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 20 Jun 96

[Interview with Ivica Kostovic, Croatian deputy prime minister, by an unidentified correspondent on 20 June; place not given; from the "Slikom Na Sliku" program—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] Dr. Kostovic, what are your comments concerning the demands by Serbs in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem for a special status?

[Kostovic] The Croatian Government has submitted a proposal and is expecting a reply from General Klein, commander of UNTAES—UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia. It is certainly important for us how the process of peaceful reintegration will be developing, to what degree current Croatian laws will be respected and adhered to in reality, whether there will be proportional representation in the police, the judiciary, and so on.

[Correspondent] According to this proposal, Croatia is to have full sovereignty over the Danube area by 15 January 1997.

[Kostovic] Yes. Certain difficulties are to be expected. Such things cannot be accomplished overnight—we cannot just say: It is finished now.

There are absolutely no problems about the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], or any other body, being present in the area. They are there to observe how human rights are respected.

As for the special status, that is already becoming silly—the area already has a special status because UNTAES is there, not the Croatian authorities. This is now a milder variant—compared to the autonomy. You can see that even Belgrade is avoiding using the term autonomy. This was only a trial balloon that was rejected energetically by UNTAES itself. [passage omitted]

Croatia: East Slavonia Serbs Demand Special Status

LD2006174396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1548 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dalj, 20 Jun (TANJUG)—The assembly of the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem today unanimously passed a declaration demanding from the international community that the region be given a special status within Croatia; the assembly also passed a decision demanding from the UN Security Council that the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES] mandate be extended for a year.

The former demand was explained in Dalj by "realistic historic, geographical, ethnic, and political circumstances"; it was especially pointed out that the decisive factor in the recognition of Croatia by the EU is that "Croatia has confirmed its willingness to adhere to its obligations in relation to the special status of certain parts of its territory where the Serbs are an absolute or relative majority."

The declaration says that the special status demanded for the Serb region should be organized and administered following the example of "the special status characteristic of the regions within the European regional association."

The declaration determines precisely which rights the Serb region should have within Croatia. Among other things, these include the right to create independently the regulations concerning the security of the people currently living in the region and their staying there.

In addition to this, the Serbs demand the right to organize regional and municipal assemblies and governments, the right to a flag, a coat of arms, and an anthem, the right to dual citizenship, local taxes, and a regional budget, and the right to be part of the local police force in line with the national structure of the population.

At the same time, it is demanded that education be organized according to special programs and in the

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languages of ethnic groups living in the region, that the local population have the right to create laws on human rights in line with international standards, and the right to separate media.

According to the declaration, the region should be permanently demilitarized; people living there would be absolved from national army service.

The region would have its own regional and municipal courts.

Immediately upon its adoption, the declaration was sent to UNTAES as the mediator in negotiations between the Serb and Croatian side on the future of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem.

The assembly deputies also unanimously decided immediately to submit a request to the UN Security Council to extend the UNTAES mandate for another year.

The current mandate of the peace force ends on 15 January 1997.

As one of the reasons for the extension—which is envisaged by the Erdut Agreement—it was pointed out that "the vindictive behavior of the Croatian side is clearly identifiable and obvious in everyday statements by Croatian officials; it has been incorporated in the selective amnesty law passed contrary to international standards."

The law on general amnesty, it was said, is "the condition for the democratic solution of the Serb region's status." [passage omitted]

Croatia: Bosnia Ex-Rebel Leader Abdic Appears in Rijeka Court

LD1806200896 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The trial of the so-called Bihac group, accused of international terrorism, has continued in the Rijeka county court. The trial began with a cross-examination of witness Fikret Abdic who, according to the bill of indictment, was supposed to have been the victim of an attack by the six-member Bihac group. He was called as a witness by the defense in order to establish his legal status in Croatia.

In a two-and-a-half-hour cross-examination of Fikret Abdic by the president of the court and the head of the defense counsel, he said, amongst other things, that, as a citizen of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, he had been uninterruptedly resident in Opatija, Croatia since 7 August 1995. He said he felt like an ordinary citizen of Croatia and that he had learned of the whole incident on 6 April while watching Croatian TV.

During the debate, a report by the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs was read out. It said that Fikret Abdic has had the status of a citizen of the Republic of Croatia since 24 September 1993. Many questions by the defense which were put to the witness but had political connotations were forbidden as evidence by the president of the court. After emerging from the court, Abdic said briefly:

[Begin Abdic recording] I said there were certain people in Sarajevo who were interested in either seeing me imprisoned or liquidating me, because these are the same people, even main agents, who kept the company only of the other party, and who are responsible for my illegal expulsion in 1987. [end recording]

Mustafa Dautovic, Fikret Abdic's bodyguard, was also cross-examined as a witness today, as was a ballistics expert on the weapon discovered which was allegedly used to commit the crime. The trial continues tomorrow with the final statements by the prosecution and the defense.

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FYROM: Commentary Supports Insistence on Name Macedonia at EU

AU2006133696 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by Nevenka Mitrevska: "The Name on European Grounds"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A question that might be of a technical nature for the EU, but is of substantial importance for the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], led the last, the third round of negotiations on the signing of the cooperation agreement to nearly total collapse, or at least to the possibility of postponing the agreement and recommencing the whole procedure at some indefinite future time. This situation did not come about because of either the EU's insistence on the so-called "regional approach" to new applicants for European cooperation, or the effort to introduce the "omitted" evolutionary clause in the draft text of the agreement. The crisis occurred at the end, when the question of the name by which our country was to be called in the agreement arose. The Macedonian negotiating team refused to sign a document on which, instead of the constitutional name, the reference of the United Nations would be used.

It was clear from the outset that the question of the name would be on the agenda of the talks. During the first negotiating round in Brussels in April this question was raised by European Commissioner Van den Broek, who obviously expressed the general feeling of unease felt by the whole Union—to negotiate and agree on cooperation not with an existing, real, and internationally recognized country with its own constitutional name, but with a "former republic" of a now officially nonexistent state. However, even without Van den Broek's initiative, the name was doomed to be an "obstacle" in the signing of the agreement for one simple reason: Greece. Its representatives in the European Commission, as the Macedonian negotiators were able to note, were the most alert and the most frequent observers throughout the negotiations. They had undoubtedly been given the mission of preventing anything in the agreement that might serve as "anticipation" (as Athens always says) of the Macedonian-Greek talks in New York on the differences over the name. This was the purpose of the publicity that Greece had created in European capitals and above all Brussels just before the beginning of the talks with the EU, that is to say, that a solution for the name "is to be found any moment." Athens's recent accusations that Macedonia was violating the New York bilateral agreement because it insists on the name were meant to serve the same purpose, as was the current unilateral cooling of relations with Macedonia and the threats (according to some information these threats have already been realized) that it would "discourage" Greek businessmen who were ready to make deals with and inside Macedonia.

Greece is aware that it started the war with Macedonia about the name in Europe and that despite all the solidarity of its EU partners it failed to win it, even at a time when our country had only just become independent and internationally recognized, and lacked friends and support. Its chances of winning this battle today are even worse. However, this does not mean that we can expect Athens to give up the irrational dispute that it imposed on us, and on itself as well, and that it will let us live in peace and conduct normal negotiations and make agreements with the world. On the contrary. As it is consistent in violating all aspects of the agreement it will be equally consistent in availing itself of all the opportunities contained in Article 11 of the same agreement, according to which Greece "retains the right to negotiate" on any Macedonia's membership in international, multilateral, and regional institutions and organizations under a name other than "FYROM."

The fact that the Macedonian delegation insisted on the constitutional name was regarded by many in Brussels as something new, as an expression of our more self-confident, more "aggressive" attitude to the international community. That is certainly impressive for a domestic audience, but the "curiosity" is that the big fuss surrounding our insistence on the name was created by Greece. The truth is that Macedonian official representatives have not signed a single document in which our country is called anything but its constitutional name. All previous international agreements in which the reference FYROM is used for any reason are accompanied by a note of the "Government of the Republic of Macedonia." This is the way relations with the World Bank have been regulated, relations with the IMF, and with some other organizations. Now that in Brussels the problem of the name threatens to postpone the signing of the agreement with the EU, the Macedonian delegations has offered—as a final concession—a similar formula. It is even prepared, if the European administration rejects the proposed solution, not to sign the agreement (for now) and to restart the whole process of negotiations.

The reason is not that we are not interested in making the "first step towards association with the Union," as we excitedly used to call the beginning of the negotiations. The reason is that if we did it with a signature under the reference FYROM, as Brussels requested, and if we voluntarily agreed to start "rechristening" our state and nation, the damage would be incomparably greater.

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FYROM: FRY Ambassador Foresees No 'Open Issues'

AU2006150896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1147 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 20 Jun (BETA)—Ambassador of the FRY in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Zoran Janackovic today said that there were no open issues between the two countries, that there had been no open issues so far, and that he believed there would be none in the future.

Upon arrival at Skopje airport, Janackovic said he had come with "a determination to develop mutual relations on the basis of the universal principles of equality, noninterference and respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, on the basis of mutual interests, as close and friendly nations and good neighbors in peace and cooperation."

Asked when the Yugoslav side would be ready to "go out into the field" and together with the Macedonian side "draw up" the boundary between the two countries, he said that the two sides were working on conforming a package of legal and other documents as stipulated by the agreement on normalizing mutual relations.

According to unofficial information, construction on the Yugoslav Embassy building in Macedonia has already begun, while the FRY Embassy will initially be in the Grand Hotel in Skopje.

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Poland: Cost of NATO Integration Discussed

96EP0071A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
18 May 96 No 20, pp 31-32

[Article by Marek Henzler: "Poland in NATO: The Time Has Come To Reckon the Cost—The Price of the Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Poland's entry into NATO is supported by our politicians and military and, as opinion polls indicate, by a definite majority of the public. We may receive the invitation to the alliance as early as the spring of 1997. This makes all the more urgent the question of the cost of integrating into NATO, a question to which, as it turns out, no one in Poland has the answer.

Recently a high Defense Ministry official admitted with a disarming candor at an unofficial meeting with reporters, "We're doing some estimates at the Defense Ministry, but we ourselves doubt their accuracy. The information appearing on this topic in the Western and Polish media is not credible, even though the cost forecasts are not completely unrealistic."

The cost of extending NATO to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia is estimated at $30-120 billion depending on who reckons it and for whom. The explanation provided for such a broad disparity in estimates is that the decision of whether to deploy in these countries nuclear weapons for NATO troops at specially built bases can either double these outlays or cut them in half!

The cost of including Poland is to account for 55-60 percent of that entire amount, that is, between $18 billion and $72 billion. The budget of the Polish Defense Ministry for 1996 is 7.9 billion new zlotys [Z], or about $3 billion. Only Z5.8 billion, that is, somewhat more than $2.2 billion, is to be spent on national defense. As for the remainder—at present somewhat more than every fourth zloty of the Defense Ministry's budget is spent on military old-age pensions, social services, and military administration and health service.

These figures show clearly that, unless the Defense Ministry's budget is increased, and unless we receive the support of our new allies from the West, then we shall be unable to cope with the financial burden entailed in our joining NATO, not even when allowance is made for a favorable minimum-cost scenario.

Col. Dr. Marian Kowalewski, director of the Department of International Security at the Defense Ministry, said, "It's hard to say which estimates will be closer to the truth. The authors of the reports made so far usually do not disclose the techniques they use to calculate the costs. In this respect comparisons with the entry of Greece or Spain into NATO won't work, because that happened in a completely different political context. Every instance of NATO's enlargement has been and will remain different."

In any discussion of such costs the propaganda factor looms large. Some will exaggerate the cost in order to frighten the public in NATO countries and the countries desiring to join the alliance. It cannot even be precluded that some reports may be inspired by third countries that are opposed to the expansion of NATO. In their turn, those who favor a rapid expansion of NATO and building a new architecture of European security are prone to say that the cost will be relatively low and affect only to a small extent the societies of West Europe. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, they are nowadays benefiting from the so-called peace dividend (at present the budgets and personnel of most armies of NATO countries are being reduced), and they are hardly anxious to subsidize arming new members of NATO from Central Europe.

The Domain of Guesswork

That the Polish Defense Ministry cannot estimate properly the cost of our integration into NATO is not surprising, in view of the absence of basic information such as the book value of the Polish military and military infrastructure. So far a unified method for appraising the value of military assets and expenses has not been developed. Until now no one has been particularly interested or even surprised by the fact that in one garrison the operating cost of a tank regiment is dozens of times higher than for a similar tank regiment at another end of Poland. It was only this year that a task force for studying this matter has been appointed. Reliable knowledge about the value of our military infrastructure will be useful in talks with NATO.

But what counts more on the battlefield is the modernity of armaments. According to optimists from the Defense Ministry we have nothing to be ashamed of in this respect, because for various groups of equipment this indicator ranges from 5 to 35 percent whereas in NATO it averages 40-45 percent. Officers from the General Staff confirm these figures but also point out that this indicator is nowadays faulty and does not provide correct information. What should be compared is not the date of manufacture of equipment but its generation. In NATO the equipment is more modern by a generation.

As before, 90 percent of our military armaments derive from the arms plants of the former USSR or is being manufactured in Poland under licenses granted under the former Warsaw Pact. We are thus to a great extent dependent on shipments of spare parts from the former

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USSR and the possibilities for repairing arms there. The Defense Ministry claims that by now we can manufacture on our own nearly all the spare parts or lubricants, but according to the General Staff our stores of spare parts have shrunk to 20 percent of the needs, and only 30 percent of defective equipment is undergoing indispensable repair....

Should we then scrap our entire post-Soviet equipment? Even after we join NATO, we shall, as regards many groups of equipment, continue to use the existing equipment for some 10-15 years. The high Defense Ministry official said, "The progress made by NATO countries in maintaining a modern and uniform standard of armaments for their armies also varies from country to country. There are leaders and there are outsiders; there is the German Army and there is the Portuguese Army. No one can expect of us to modernize our army all at once."

Within NATO certain solutions are common. The air forces, reconnaissance services, telecommunications, and liaison have been extensively unified. On the other hand there does not exist—and if it did it would be absurd—a unified system of drilling nor a common field artillery standard (e.g., the English retain the 105-mm caliber whereas 155 mm is mandatory in most other NATO armies). In this respect every country is trying to protect its national interests, or, in actuality, the interests of its arms companies. Poland, while assenting to various political rationales, should not overlook its own economic interests. That will also largely affect the cost of refitting our Army.

Talks with NATO have already been underway for several years, at various levels, but so far the alliance has not posed even one objective or requirement to the Polish military. Everything is happening in the domain of guesswork.... Soon this is going to change. As early as this May experts from two NATO-linked institutions (one U.S. and one German) will arrive in Poland in order to estimate the value of our military potential in NATO money and by means of NATO techniques. Thereupon, by the end of December they will draft a multiple-variant report on the cost of joining NATO as well as a timetable for Poland's adaptation to NATO standards. For this report to be credible, the experts must obtain access to secret information about the Polish military. To protect that information, we have already concluded with the United States an agreement for the transfer of classified data, and we shall soon sign a similar agreement with Germany.

Colors as in NATO

An answer to the question of the cost of joining NATO is not known by the generals of the General Staff either. A top commander admitted, "At one time we calculated that the Polish military needs to spend 1.3 trillion old zlotys on the entire process of its modernization by the year 2010. But that is wishful thinking, too. We realize that ours is not a country that can afford to equip its military abundantly. It is likewise difficult to calculate separately the cost of restructuring the military and the cost of integration into NATO because these costs are interlinked, and by now, wherever we can afford it, we are adapting to the alliance's standards."

In the opinion of the higher commanders the reorganization underway so far will within two or three years result in the full compatibility of combat and mobilizational readiness systems, as well as of reconnaissance and communications systems, between the Polish and NATO military.

In practice the work on a concept for restructuring the air defense system has already been completed. This concept presupposes the formation of a unified command system and system for exchanging information with NATO countries on the air situation and meteorological phenomena. Our airfields already are being adapted to receiving NATO aircraft and restoring in Poland their combat readiness. In return, we want Polish aircraft to avail themselves of NATO bases. We are beginning to equip our aircraft with a new friend-or-foe identification system as well as with devices serving to utilize satellite navigation systems. Military air traffic control is to be integrated with its civilian counterpart. Bidding for a multipurpose combat aircraft, and subsequently also for a transport aircraft, for delivery to our air forces will be announced soon. Polish seaports are being adapted to resupplying NATO shipping, and our Navy is adapting itself to the maneuvering rules and forms of orders and signal commands used by NATO fleets.

New manuals of rules and instructions have been drafted and introduced for our commanders. The Polish military is by now equipped with NATO maps, and our officers pinpoint combat situations on maps by means of the same colors as their colleagues from NATO. By 1998 the construction of the Military Basic Geodesic Network (about 600 points) is to be completed.

Practically every Polish officer who is fluent in the language of Shakespeare or Goethe can nowadays participate in various kinds of training, exercises, and conferences at the academies or in the armies of NATO countries. This year alone, under the Individual Partnership Program, a total of 229 various joint Polish-NATO projects is envisaged, plus several hundred others under bilateral agreements between Poland and the countries belonging to NATO.

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The General Staff envisages that all these projects, intended to promote adaptation to NATO standards and procedures, should enable us within two or three years to undertake close cooperation, inclusive of joint operations.

Echoes of Dissent

Early in April we presented in Brussels a 27-page "Letter for Discussion." That document is not being made public during the talks with NATO. In its political part we express our satisfaction with the possibility of individual dialogue and declare that we desire to obtain full membership in NATO, with all attendant rights and obligations.

"This is bidden by our geopolitics," commented Director Marian Kowalewski of the Defense Ministry. Poland is not interested in the French or Spanish way (participation in the political structure of the alliance) or in the Danish way (without nuclear weapons and foreign troops on its own territory). "For the present and in the immediate future we perceive no need for foreign troops or nuclear weapons to be stationed in Poland, but at the same time there should exist no formal obstacles to such stationing by NATO if the need arises," said Col. Kowalewski. Hence also Polish legislation will soon regulate the issue of the sojourn of foreign troops in Poland and the participation of our troops in operations abroad.

The above-mentioned letter also contains a military section that describes what we have already accomplished and how we view the pertinent model of our armed forces. We stress Polish efforts on behalf of "interoperativeness" with the armies of NATO countries. The letter ends with our questions concerning NATO.

It should seem that this currently most important document on joining NATO should have been drafted jointly by the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the General Staff of the Polish Army. Yet Chief of General Staff Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki familiarized himself with its full text only two weeks after it had been presented, just before his departure for a meeting of chiefs of staff in Brussels, when he explicitly asked the defense minister about it.

When asked about this matter, Zdzislaw Czekierda, spokesman of the chief of the General Staff, refused to answer. As for Col. Kowalewski of the Defense Ministry, he pooh-poohed the issue. "In composing that letter we had of course availed ourselves of the information provided by the General Staff, but we polished it further in Brussels the night before the letter's formal presentation and were unable to keep Gen. Wilecki posted about it all...." Thus the echoes of dissension between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff reached as far as the main headquarters of NATO.

The first Poland-NATO meeting within the framework of individual dialogue was held in early May. At that meeting we presented, among other things, the basic premises of the National Plan for Integration With NATO. Deputy National Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka admitted, "At this stage it is easier to discuss political rather than military factors." The latter could have been more readily discussed had our financial possibilities been better known. Yet the 1996 budget of the Defense Ministry allots only Z60 million for the Partnership for Peace program. At present we can continue to maintain the Polish IFOR [Implementation Force] battalion in Bosnia solely owing to the savings made on civil defense exercises and the budgetary contingency funds of the Office of the Ministerial Council. But such sporadic injections of funds will not pave the road to NATO for our military. Even before this year is over, a five-year plan for funding the modernization of the Army and its integration into NATO should be prepared. And this, unfortunately, has to be understood by the Polish taxpayer. Quid pro quo; there is no free lunch.

[Box, p 32]

Per Capita 1994 Spending on Defense in Individual Countries

France—$361
Spain—$86
Netherlands—$227
Norway—$464
FRG—$184
Turkey—$65
Great Britain—$307
Italy—$173
Canada—$251
United States—$828
Poland *—$77

* Data for Poland are for 1995—spending on the entire domain of defense, inclusive of, among other things, administration, pensions for retired military personnel, and so forth.

Source: "NATO Vademecum"

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Poland: Polish-U.S. Crime Commission To Be Set Up in Jul

WS2006124996 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 20 Jun 96 p 4

[Article by "KES": "Poland-United States; Antigang Commission as Early as July?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish and U.S. Governments want to establish a bilateral commission for fighting organized crime. An agreement is to be signed in July, during President Kwasniewski's visit in the United States. U.S. representatives of the secret services, customs services, tax revenue services, and the police met with Polish authorities at the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] yesterday to discuss methods of combating international car-theft gangs, drug dealers and money-laundering rings. Leszek Miller, the URM head who presided over the meeting, stated that the Polish side suggested that a center be established in Poland for training experts to combat organized crime, that courses be provided for our officers in the United States, and that a permanent system of exchanging data on crime groups be set up.

Jonathon M. Winer, deputy assistant secretary of the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau at the Department of State, who headed the U.S. delegation, spoke at length about the necessity of solving the problem of car thefts in the United States. "There are Polish car-theft gangs in the United States. We recently liquidated one such network in Chicago in cooperation with Poland."

The Americans welcomed with satisfaction the Polish offer to host this fall an international conference, under the auspices of the UN, on combating car theft and smuggling.

Poland: President Kwasniewski on Gdansk Shipyard Bankruptcy

LD2106093496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0600 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the Gdansk Shipyard Solidarity commission is holding a demonstration in defense of the yard. More than 10,000 union members from all over Poland are expected to participate. The demonstration is to take place in Warsaw. The protesters' route will include the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Ownership Transformations, and the Sejm [lower house of parliament].

It is expected that the protest action, which is being organized by the shipyard Solidarity commission, will be supported by the public-sector employees, miners, arms-industry workers, and the Warsaw Ursus.

If the government does not show any interest in the problems of the shipyard today, we shall organize a demonstration on a scale Warsaw has not seen before, Piotr Zak, Solidarity spokesman, said.

President Aleksander Kwasniewski, who was the guest of the Polish Radio First Program this morning, said that the decision to declare the shipyard's bankruptcy was painful therapy but that it raised the possibility for a positive outcome. The president thinks the discussion around the shipyard should focus on economic issues rather than political ones, which also happen to be short-term.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] Nobody has said that, generally speaking, the shipbuilding industry in Europe is in trouble. It is not just a Polish problem but also a German, Norwegian, French, and Spanish one. It is a problem of all of the countries that until quite recently were the leading powers in the shipbuilding industry.

Second, nobody has pointed out that Gdansk Shipyard has been in trouble for many years. There have been several attempts to deal with the problem. We remember the hopes attached to Barbara Piasecka-Jonhson. We remember the stories about foreign investors who were supposed to come here, buy the shipyard, provide assistance, and make investments. I remember dozens of various promises. These promises only postponed the time of the most difficult decision. In my opinion, the time has come now. [end recording]

Poland: Sejm Speaker Zych Allegedly Served Prison Sentence

WS2006124796 Warsaw NIE in Polish 20 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Marek Baranski: "Shame on Zych"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *We have good news for the electorate of the Polish Peasant Party. Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych, a firm foundation of the law, a legalist as hard as Swedish steel but who we refer to as a "chicken," is an ordinary human being. In his prime he did time, just like many of us. He served out his sentence as a detainee in Zielona Gora.*

Zych's fellow prisoners remember that he was quite okay. He was released after a year or so, but they did not forget him because the Sejm speaker took care of the library, distributed books. In addition, because he had the gift of gab, he was also fairly active in the internal prison radio; he prepared educational and information broadcasts.

Jailers also have pleasant memories of Jozef Zych. One of them (his function and name is known to the editorial staff), when he sees the Sejm speaker on television,

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recalls that in the old days he also was so quiet, he never made any trouble; he also kept his cell clean and maintained his personal hygiene at an appropriate level. It is no wonder, he says, that Zych became a respectable citizen. Our penitentiary system, the fact that the state provided education and took care of everyone, offered such a chance. The problem is that not everyone wanted to take advantage of this, which is a pity because we would have more good speakers today.

The punishment administered to Zych was erased [from records] a long time ago, and, as a citizen, Mr. Zych is entitled to protect his secret. However, Jozef Zych the politician must not keep such secrets until the end of his political career. Even though it is not appropriate to look at the record of an ordinary citizen, it certainly is appropriate to do this in the case of a politician, especially if he has concealed something from voters and public opinion.

Even though we could not get the relevant documents—because the punishment was erased [from records]—we did find people who remembered the Sejm speaker as a young man. What they told us suggests that he got into deep water in the early 1960's, when he was in his twenties and worked as a teacher—Zych started his professional career as a teacher. Then he became the chief of the powiat [small administrative unit] division of the Polish Pathfinders Union [ZHP] in Krosno Odrzanskie. His office was in the same building that housed the offices of all of the most important institutions in the town—from the Powiat Committee of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] to the ZHP. He organized a youth camp in the nearby town of Radnica. He was the person in charge there; he also took on the duties of a steward. After the camp closed, it turned out that some money was missing. The sum was so large that a prosecutor had to take a closer look at the case. It was actually a female prosecutor (her name is also known to the editorial staff). [passage omitted]

Things were getting very unpleasant for Jozef then. They went so far that he decided to go to a comrade (name known to the editorial staff) of the local PZPR Powiat Committee to ask for help. In the beginning, he tried to conceal the truth, saying that he was innocent and then claiming that his deputy made the decisions while he was away. Finally, he pleaded guilty and asked that no punishment be administered to him, promising that he would never do such a thing again. Indeed, the party lent him a helping hand. His comrades phoned the prosecutor; they certainly did intercede with her for him. However, he simply could not get away with what he had done because it was determined that an offense had been committed. Nonetheless, Zych was treated as mildly as possible under those circumstances. Some say that he was sentenced for a year in prison; the jailer who watched over Zych says that he got a year and a half but was released on parole after serving two-thirds of the sentence. We failed to find this out precisely. However, it is certain that he did time and that he concealed this fact in his biography; it is as if nothing had happened in Krosno Odrzanskie. Incidentally, he never returned to that town.

Despite the years that have passed since that vacation adventure, Mr. Zych is still behaving as if he were constantly afraid of something. What he is afraid of is probably that prison sentence. [passage omitted]

Has anyone taken advantage of this fear? It is hard to tell. Perhaps [PSL Chairman] Pawlak knew Zych's secret. After all, Zych never opposed him—neither as chairman of the PSL Chief Council nor as Sejm speaker. On the contrary, he always acts in line with Pawlak's interests: He scheduled the presidential elections for a time that was most convenient to Pawlak and the PSL, effectively turning down all other suggestions. He also refused to run in those elections even though, if he had said yes, the PSL would have fielded him and not the former prime minister [Pawlak], who was in a losing position.

He is very cooperative in dealing not only with PSL leaders, but also with the church. [passage omitted]

Poland: Politicians, Daily React to NIE Article on Zych

WS2006131496 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by E.Cz., M.M., and P.W.R.: "The NIE Article Inspired by the SLD? Sejm Speaker Zych Admits: I Served a Prison Sentence"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *After the publication in the NIE weekly, Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych admitted that in 1961 he was sentenced for eight months in prison for dereliction of duty. He also said that he spent six months in custody in Zielona Gora pending an inquiry. The 58-year-old Polish Peasant Party [PSL] politician was 23 at that time. The Presidium of the Sejm will not take any action against Zych, [Deputy] Sejm Speaker Malachowski announced. Many politicians are suggesting that the NIE article was inspired by the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD].* [passage omitted]

In an interview for the Third Program of Polish Radio, Zych stated that he does not intend to do anything about the issue, adding that "facts are facts, and it is difficult to call them into question." The Sejm speaker claims that he has never concealed this fact in his biography. He recalls that last February he gave an interview to

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GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI in which he confessed that he had made a big mistake once.

The PSL Outraged

The PSL was taken aback and outraged at the NIE publication. The politicians whom we asked about it defended the Sejm speaker, stressing that this is a fact "from a distant past," which, from the legal point of view, has already been erased. Only Jan Bury stated that "the last authority that could be found at the highest level has been shaken"; however, he hastened to add: "I tend to put this down to his young age."

"This article is yet another element in escalating the anti-PSL campaign in media linked to the SLD. For a month now, TRYBUNA has been publishing materials attacking the PSL and its politicians. For six weeks NIE has been slandering PSL politicians," says Janusz Piechocinski. He supposes that this is happening according to a scenario drawn up by leading SLD politicians, who recently met in Mierki. According to him, the thing the SLD wants to achieve is to hold early parliamentary elections.

Janusz Dobrosz also sees the publication as "yet another element of the SLD's game," although he does not suspect that his "coalition colleagues" are behind it. [passage omitted]

The Opposition Suspects, the SLD Denies

The Confederation for an Independent Poland expressed its outrage at the attack on Zych. In a statement signed by Krzysztof Krol, the confederates point out that the facts given by the NIE weekly were common knowledge among members of parliament, but so far no one has decided to "accuse" the Sejm speaker of committing offenses that took place 30 years ago. This is because the most important things are his conduct over recent years and his impartial involvement in strengthening the authority of the Polish Sejm.

Ryszard Bugaj of the Union of Labor expects that a representative of the SLD will finally make a statement on this issue. "Silence will mean that they back the dirty methods used by that individual (Jerzy Urban—editor's note). I do not think this man did this of his own accord. I believe that this time it was a miscalculation; people will defend the Sejm speaker," Bugaj said. [passage omitted]

SLD Club Spokesman Andrzej Urbanczyk denies that the NIE article was inspired by left-wing politicians. "If someone thinks Jerzy Urban allows others to steer him, he is wrong. Urban is ruthless to all," Urbanczyk says. According to Urbanczyk, the issue will not affect relations between the PSL and the SLD. The SLD spokesman stresses that, from the legal point of view, the sentence was erased a long time ago. [passage omitted]

[In the same issue, RZECZPOSPOLITA also runs on page five a 300-word commentary by Maciej Lukasiewicz entitled "Standards and Methods." Lukasiewicz notes that "Political battles are becoming increasingly fierce. Once again we see the problem of politicians' public responsibility for their biographies." Lukasiewicz goes on to say that "we have already seen a lack of this responsibility" among politicians, and mentions Kwasniewski's education, Pawlak's involvement in the InterAms affair, and Oleksy's friendly relations with Alganov. "Now the issue is about Jozef Zych, a man who was considered a politician who settles current scandals and cools emotions." Lukasiewicz asks: "Will he be the first to take appropriate action because of his biography?" and adds, "If this happened, we would finally witness a new quality on the Polish political scene—establishing a standard of decency. It must be added, though, the manner in which this is happening is particularly disgusting" because "NIE journalists probably wanted to deliver a hard blow in the ongoing political battle."]

Poland: New Head of 'White Intelligence' at UOP Appointed

WS2006133196 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by K. Kaszynski and J. Podgorski: "The UOP's 'White Intelligence' Has a New Head"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Colonel Stanislaw Hoc has been appointed director of the Analysis and Information Bureau of the Office of State Protection [UOP]. He is the fourth head in the less than six-year history of the bureau that deals with so-called white intelligence.*

As ZYCIE WARSZAWY has established, Col. Stanislaw Hoc is to take over as director of the UOP Analysis and Information Bureau. He was formerly deputy director of the Counterintelligence Directorate of UOP. He is the fourth director of the bureau in the less than six years of its existence. The founder and first head of the bureau was Konstanty Miodowicz, who went on to take over as head of UOP counterintelligence. His successor was Piotr Naimski, who moved on to deputy head of intelligence.

Col. Hoc's immediate predecessor was Captain Adam Aduszkiewicz, who resigned from service in UOP a few weeks ago. Aduszkiewicz is to be heard by the Sejm Secret Services Commission today.

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Some suggested that Aduszkiewicz's resignation had to do with instructions issued by UOP Chief Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski on "monitoring unrest and strikes in companies." "We want to know why Capt. Aduszkiewicz resigned and make sure it had nothing to do with Kapkowski's orders," ZYCIE WARSZAWY heard from a member of the Sejm Secret Services Commission. Aduszkiewicz himself confirmed in conversation with ZYCIE WARSZAWY reporters that his decision is the "result of deep thought on the overall operations of UOP."

The Analysis and Information Bureau emerged within the structure of the secret services when UOP was formed in 1990. It was conceived and established by activists of the Freedom and Peace [Wolnosc i Niepodleglosc] movement. The Bureau deals primarily with so-called white intelligence—that is, monitoring open-source materials (including the press) and processes taking place in political, economic, and social life.

Poland: Effect of Oleksy Affair on UOP Discussed

96EP0072A Poznan WPROST in Polish 1 Jun 96 No 21, pp 19-21

[Article by Stanislaw Janecki with the cooperation of Pawel Bawolec: "The State, Inc.: When Will the Dismantling of the Principal Structures of the Third Polish Republic End?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The most publicized murder of recent weeks has been purely political. Yes, this means not some criminal murder but the "killing of the secret services." The murder of these services was made public on 26 May by Andrzej Celinski, a Freedom Union politician, on blaming the officiating president and prime minister of this country as accessories.

Modern doctrines of the state and the law identify foreign policy and domestic security as two cardinal aspects of national sovereignty. Basically, national sovereignty is decided by the performance of diplomacy and the secret services. As to how that performance is effectuated, that is among the top secrets passed on to successive governments of a country regardless of their political views. This is one of the distinguishing factors of ripeness for democracy. Unfortunately, that is not the case in Poland. In this country the governing administration seems to profess the philosophy of "after me the deluge."

How else can it be considering that the prime minister, Cimoszewicz, is considering the possibility of paralyzing the special services for several years just in order to purify the atmosphere around them? President Kwasniewski first announced a total lustration, and thereupon, saying "the game is over," declared his desire to have a total white book on the so-called Oleksy affair published. Leszek Kubicki, minister of justice, is encouraging the media to publish the complete classified version of the rationale for Colonel Gorzkiewicz's decision to quash the Oleksy investigation, with the prime minister commenting on this by making an appeal for avoiding hypocrisy on the grounds as everything about this affair is already a public secret anyway.

What is the point of this brouhaha, which former Deputy Attorney General Stanislaw Iwanicki has termed "unprecedented in the history of the special services"? Iwanicki asked bluntly, "Is the point to liquidate those who know too much?"

In that context what are we to think of the joking comment made by Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski, then Acting Chief of the UOP [Office for State Protection], to RZECZPOSPOLITA, "From my reading I learn that (Yakimishin—Eds.) is alive and well." When asked, "But is he in danger?" he answered, "I think not." The head of the most secret institution in the state is suggesting that he learns how the agents of that institution are doing from reading the newspapers.

Thus, while Stanislaw Iwanicki fears that "agents in Russia, when accused of treason, can expect only one verdict," Col. Karpinski radiates jollity. Yet, according to WPROST's informants, for the last few months it has not been possible to establish any contact with Yakimishin, although he is supposedly "not in danger" and "receiving promotions." What is more, that is why already at the end of last year it was not possible to get him out of Russia. Earlier he himself had been undecided about it. Why? The circumstances of this affair now indicate that, even before Andrzej Milczanowicz's address in the Sejm, Moscow already knew that the Poles had subverted a Russian agent and already then began to search for him.

It was then that Yakimishin, in addition to several other selected candidates, became subject to surveillance by not only Russian counterintelligence but also Russian internal investigators. The Polish Office for State Protection surrounded Yakimishin with a smoke screen. It was only the "loquaciousness" of Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz that enabled the Russian to become certain.

Before Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz had announced his rationale for quashing the investigation of Oleksy, Yakimishin was merely in danger, but now he is doomed: intelligence services settle matters of this kind without any haste—in a year, two, or 10. In view of this should Gorzkiewicz be held accountable only for disclosing a state secret?

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As to whether Yakimishin was a double agent, that is not the most important thing. What matters is the principle that an agent and those closest to him should be safely evacuated even when this is practically hopeless. For obtaining future sources of information hinges on it. Surprising in this context is the official optimism of Minister of Internal Affairs Siemiatkowski, who declared, "No activity of the intelligence services has been adversely affected just because several officers have been furloughed." But the point is not the officers but how is the Office of State Protection utilizing the internal investigator's report on their activities?

Even now bets are being made on how soon this report will reach the media. And this is likely because Zbigniew Siemiatkowski himself described what morsels it will contain: "It will light up the entire kitchen, the operating procedures of the intelligence services; it will contain many descriptions of current affairs." But would any foreign counterpart of the Polish minister frivolously serve to foreign intelligence services "on a tray" a document of such importance? After all, if the foreign services will thus know what to look for, sooner or later they will find it.

"The affair began with obtaining a valuable foreign source of information," said Kapkowski, but at the same time he claimed that that valuable source provided the Office of State Protection with a scrap of paper containing "a notation that does not meet the basic requirements for a professional document deriving from intelligence services." What is more, Kapkowski claims that, on the basis of that scrap of paper, the Office of State Protection is looking for an agent planted in the Polish intelligence, this time for a real, deep mole.

What should the intelligence service of countries allied with us think of professionals from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Office of State Protection, such as Kapkowski?

If we also consider that the ruling party, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], is violating basic principles of diplomacy by divulging confidential correspondence with the Vatican, the picture that emerges is that of a government suffering from a profound schizophrenia. And here, as in any other case of paranoia, the patient keeps trying to prove that it is his surroundings that are insane. Thus there was the impressive publicity gained by Polish efforts to promote our aspirations to NATO, staged with considerable hoopla several weeks ago in Brussels by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, but at the same time Western experts commented on the replacement of the head of the Military Information Services, revealing how far these services are from being public in nature.

What of it that Minister Rosati is trying to demonstrate our zeal for joining NATO considering that for trifling formal reasons the offer of the Americans to provide missiles for the Polish Army was declined. What of it that in the past at the CIA head office no one doubted that the Office of State Protection (UOP) did, while Andrzej Milczanowski was minister of internal affairs, prove many times over its credibility and collaborate successfully with the U.S. secret services, considering that now information is coming from Warsaw about purges within the UOP. To be sure, Col. Kapkowski declared immediately that "there will be no purges at all," but he termed the furloughed officers a handful of people "who had no broad support within the services" and who moreover "violated every principle of work of the UOP, including its apolitical nature."

Andrzej Kapkowski may speak thus considering that Marek Borowski, a leading SdRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland] politician, has by now provided a general political explanation of the events. "The destruction of the intelligence services began with the struggle against the Left." When, however, the special Sejm committee with Lucyna Pietrzyk as the chairperson did not corroborate the charges of political manipulation of the services, it turned out that, in the opinion of the SLD members of that committee, "the committee is being exploited by political losers from the opposition to settle a score with the Left." On the occasion, Lucyna Pietrzyk herself, until then praised for her moderation and impartiality, was called partisan and amenable to political suggestions. Andrzej Celinski suspects a broader strategy behind this: "When the legal procedures began to adopt a direction inconvenient to the SLD, they became disclaimed and a new course of action was taken." That new course of action is precisely the purge of personnel within the UOP.

"We must resume secrecy as the basis of our work," said Col. Andrzej Kapkowski, yet a few days later he blabbed to all of Poland how the source obtained by Polish intelligence was used. In this context, the disclaimers of Ministers Leszek Kubicki and Zbigniew Siemiatkowski that they will disclose material "not serving to identify the representatives of a foreign intelligence service recruited by the Polish special services and the agents of these services present in discrete operational activities" are just so much hot air.

Any operational document is a mine of knowledge to analysts from a foreign intelligence service, and leaving the names blank merely delays the moment of identification for a few weeks.

Gromoslaw Czempinski, former head of the UOP, claims that Col. Gorzkiewicz's rationale for quashing

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the prosecution of Oleksy exceeds all bounds of what can be made public. The prosecutor provided "too detailed a description of the affair, and took a position on the actions of the officers." In effect, that rationale is "our present to the Russian intelligence."

"Continued publicity on this affair will magnify the extent of social and political damage and damage to the government," said General Czempinski. Minister Siemiatkowski is assuring us that he is "standing guard over state secrets" and will not permit disclosure of information on "operating procedures, ways of obtaining sources of information, and the knowledge available to Polish intelligence and counterintelligence about our enemies operating in this country and abroad." But what of it considering that nearly every public comment by Col. Kapkowski on the behavior of the UOP officers in the Oleksy affair is an obvious violation of these rules. Siemiatkowski is sending a clear signal abroad: "Such a mix-up has never before happened to the UOP." This implies encouragement for redoubled control of activities of the intelligence in the East.

A high representative of British intelligence, a long-time member of the British MI-6, wonderingly told WPROST: "The head of an intelligence service who cannot discipline it in accordance with regular rules and instead uses the mass media for this purpose deserves immediate dismissal. Keeping a secret does not mean concealing mistakes. What are internal procedures for? External investigation is indispensable, too, but public opinion can be resorted to as a means of control only in the event of a breach of law. The news we receive from Poland is simply grotesque. I asked a dozen or so experienced intelligence and counterintelligence agents how it is possible to make egregious mistakes in operational work and not violate the law or at least the law on intelligence services. Yet that is precisely what the Polish minister is suggesting—the law was not violated, yet the culprits will be punished."

"At the beginning of the so-called Oleksy affair the leaks were of a personal-political nature, but now they concern almost exclusively the operational material of the various secret services," observed Ryszard Bugaj, leader of the Labor Union party and a member of the special Sejm committee. "And that will continue until it is demonstrated to the public that outgoing President Walesa prepared a political provocation."

Poland: Impact of Oleksy Affair on Parties, Society

96EP0071B Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish 12 May 96 No 19, p 3

[Article by Adam Szostkiewicz: "Olin-Land: Polish Politics Since the Oleksy Affair"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "In Poland, meaning nowhere," Jarry wrote. This hurt, but we remembered that aphorism as a memento of our national megalomania. The Jozef Oleksy affair is a blow dealt to our dreams of normalcy, a blow all the more painful because it originated from within. Following the Sejm address by Minister Milczanowski we awakened in a different country, in which it is difficult to feel at home. The loser in the "Oleksy affair" is the Third Polish Republic. It is now under the shadow of "Olin-land," a totally party-minded country where the masses of citizens are cannon fodder for politicians and where by now a no-holds-barred political struggle unto death is under way.

What Was the Stake in This Game?

The supporters of Minister Milczanowski's decision claim that they were not surprised by the quashing of the investigation of the former prime minister because, given the current political alignment, the negative outcome of Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz's investigation was a foregone conclusion.... [passage omitted]

The moral to be learned by the broad public from the supposedly impartial guardians of the law is that it was not the O. Properly speaking, there was no O. at all. Adult people were treated like schoolboys given a grade of zero. Colonel Gorzkiewicz drafted a long report, but he did not address one fundamental question: How is it possible for two interpretations of the same operational material to differ so diametrically? In the end, in both cases we are dealing with serious people. And that is just why the Kowalskis and the Malinowskis must explore the hidden mainspring of the entire Jozef O. affair. Well, it turns out that the mainspring is, of course, politics. But such an explanation damages the credibility of all the actors in the drama.

Perhaps then a plan for further action should be considered. Perhaps a lifesaving belt should be kept in storage for those who rallied behind Milczanowski and now must defend themselves against humiliating charges of vindictiveness and bungling.

After all, the stake in the game commenced by Milczanowski in the Sejm is how millions of Poles perceive the workings of a democratic state. Whom does this game serve, and how?

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Once the dust of battle settled, it turned out that questions and doubts outnumber the answers. Those who in principle disbelieve the postcommunists may have been content with Milczanowski's explanations, but they were not the issue, just as Oleksy's partisans were not the issue. Both groups may stick to their interpretations of the Oleksy affair, but that will change nothing.

The politically decisive factor is the question of which version of that affair will be accepted by the broad segment of the uncommitted public, which supports neither side in the conflict or remains undecided. I believe that this broad segment has not been convinced by the initiators of the Oleksy affair and that therefore these initiators are politically the losers.

Questions by Kibitzers

What is the man on the street to think of it at the threshold of the new electoral campaign? Gentlemen, why should that campaign be started at all, the Kowalskis and Malinowskis ask. You mentioned the peril to national security, but you did not explain the nature of that peril.

Have you considered that, in the event of its fiasco, the electoral drive will ricochet against the special services of the Republic?

If you have considered it while at the same time being aware that the current political alignment, based on a virtual monopoly of power by a single party, will emerge from that confrontation relatively unscathed, then how can this be termed otherwise than the lack of an instinct for self-preservation of the state? If you have not considered it, how else can it be termed other than lack of imagination?

Of course, the Oleksy affair will continue to be reflected in the media and in political discussions, and after awhile the historians will attend to it. It has changed the social awareness of Poles by strengthening their distrust of those in power and of politicians and politics in general as a form of civic activism. This is yet another evil that will persist.

Earlier a similar effect, from the standpoint of the public's image of politics, was produced by the "Macierewicz List," which named supposed agents of the communist special services who had remained publicly active after 1989. Did anybody believe in that list who was not previously exposed to a similar type of argument in the political struggle? [passage omitted]

Wins and Losses

What then is the truth, we impotently ask. [passage omitted]

Well, I believe that the consequences of the Oleksy affair differ at different levels: They are injurious to our political system and they benefit the current alignment of forces in power but are disadvantageous to Jozef Oleksy himself. Jozef Oleksy and such fans of his as Deputy Sierakowska are becoming a burden on their own political formation.

The image of the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] would have been much more positive had Oleksy, acting like a man wronged, withdrawn from active politics, by analogy with what the leaders of democratic European parties would do in a similar situation. By remaining the leader of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland party he is exposed to further attacks, which are hardly likely to improve the morale of the members and sympathizers of that party.

But a more important consequence of the Oleksy affair is the further shrinkage of the space for political dialogue. [passage omitted]

The Oleksy affair will multiply the numbers of both "relativists" and "dogmatists." By the same token the prestige of centrists, who are not ashamed of a political vocabulary that still uses such words as dialogue, compromise, cooperation, liberalism, and democracy, will again sink.

If spokesmen for these values are eliminated from Polish politics, then the multiparty system, weakly rooted as it is anyway, will be still further damaged. I have nothing against "the right" and "the left" so long as they accept pluralism, both internally and among their rivals, and tolerate the political center—something that they have been tolerating so far in view of the desirable, moderating role that centrism plays in a majority of European democracies.

In Poland nowadays there exist two opposing blocs of which only one—the post-PRL [Polish People's Republic] Social Democracy in an alliance with the post-PRL Peasant Party [PSL]—is politically effective. The other, "rightist" bloc exists only in theory, as a hypothesis, without any major chance of becoming reality. A collision between these two blocs will crush the people professing political centrism.

The ambitions of the leaders of the ilk of Jozef Oleksy, who strive to firmly dominate their political camp, are echoed, nearly as in a mirror reflection, by the ambitions of Jan Olszewski, leader of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland. Olszewski believes in

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the historic opportunity of his Movement and it seems to him that he will win on his own. Whence this certainty?

Opinion polls nowadays provide encouraging support for Olszewski's party, but that is not yet sufficient foundation for assuring certain electoral victory. One or two mistakes, a deft move by adversaries, and this trend may dramatically break off. Such spectacular plummeting of rising stars has happened before; just consider the Center Accord and the Liberal-Democratic Congress and of the presidential candidacy of Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz.

Thus I would not delude myself by believing that in the foreseeable future, meaning within more or less a year until the parliamentary elections, a miracle will happen. There will be no unification of the "Camp of Post-August Poland," because no such camp exists any longer and no significant political drive in that direction exists either. The crowd of Solidarity supporters outside the Gdansk Shipyard in August 1980 has disintegrated in the 1990's into mutually exclusive electorates of Walesa, Kwasniewski, Olszewski, and Kuron.

In the best case two or three lasting centers of opposition to the SLD, which in no way can all be labeled "rightist," will arise; one represented by Olszewski's Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland and the other rallied round the Freedom Union, along with perhaps a third rallied round Ryszard Bugaj's Labor Union—although the fate of that party is the least foreseeable. Other great unknowns are Solidarity and Lech Walesa.

Centrists, Unite!

All this is too little to put the post-PRL bloc on the defensive and gain a majority in the Sixth Sejm, because only such an outcome would mean a turning point in the current alignment of political forces.

Perhaps then it would be worthwhile to reorient thinking and political action onto a different target: the strengthening and expansion of the political center. This means a center that is, by its very nature anyhow, open to both the right and the left and may, depending on the outcome of negotiations on terms, form with them tactical or even strategic alliances. At present there exist no conditions for a compromise with the hard-line postcommunists (and these are, unfortunately, very numerous), and the radical right too is shying from such a compromise. What is more, the first 100 days of the Presidency of Kwasniewski are nudging the moderates in the rightist direction.

Yet centrists, whether declared or potential, do exist in every significant political party and it is they who hold, owing to their ability to respect both liberal and traditional values, the key to the success of the Polish modernization commenced seven years ago and still far from completed. Now a major peril to the future of reform is the currently increasingly stronger tendency of the governing SLD-PSL coalition toward a partisan and centralized governance (its latest and most ill-omened instance is the concept of public television a la Ryszard Miazek).

No one likes democracy because it means many parties. Democracy is valued when the system performs as efficiently and productively as possible, when it makes the people living under it have the feeling of liberty, security, and justice. That was to be the goal of the reforms. The Oleksy affair is making this goal recede. The political after-effects of that affair strengthen the logic of the bifurcation into leftist and rightist blocs, which corresponds neither to the real political divisions—the political map being much more complex—nor to the needs of the future.

Poland: Grigori Yakimishin, Alleged Russian Agent, Profiled

96EP0072B Poznan WPROST in Polish 1 Jun 96 No 21, pp 19-20

[Article by Stanislaw Janecki, Krzysztof Grabowski, and Joanna Kluzik: "The Man From Nowhere: What Is Known About Grigori Yakimishin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Grigori Yakimishin, Russian diplomat and intelligence officer, was not at all subverted by Polish intelligence, because he had been from the beginning planted by the Russians, SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] politicians claim. "All this subverting business is fiction; suffice it to check his whereabouts at the time when he was supposedly in Warsaw," said WPROST's informant. But he noted that this does not detract from the value of the information he provided. According to other sources, Yakimishin is not a Polish informer and the confusion about him is intended to protect another, real and deep mole.

As early as last January, when his name was first mentioned in the context of the Oleksy affair, Grigori Karasin, spokesman of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, admitted that Yakimishin works in Department IV (Europe) of that ministry. In February it was mentioned that the ministry intends to assign him to Baku. Recently many Polish reporters have been unsuccessfully trying to reach Yakimishin both at the central offices of the ministry and in Baku. The reactions of Yakimishin's supposed colleagues indicate that many of them heard his name for the first time. Yakimishin's private telephone is always busy. No member of his family can be located either. During a news conference Grigori Karasin refused to say anything about Yakimishin and

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merely expressed surprise that so many Polish reporters were interested in him.

In Poland Yakimishin first appeared in the early 1980's, as a reporter for the Novosti News Agency at its Gdansk office. He worked in Gdansk for four years. He was deputy to Boris Alekseyev, the head of that office, and in charge of providing the Polish media with Soviet texts. At the time he was widely known as not a reporter but an exceptionally sociable individual. Alekseyev complained that he could not control him. Yakimishin arrived in Gdansk at a time when the offices of various institutions of the then USSR, including those of Novosti and Aeroflot, began to be spring up there like mushrooms after rain.

During his stay in our country he spoke good Polish and often referred to his Polish roots. Officially his mother was an Azerbaijani from Baku and his father a Ukrainian deriving from the eastern part of the Second Polish Republic, and hence a Polish citizen. Mentioning his Polish roots made it easier for Yakimishin to establish contacts. He became friendly with the editors of the local media and heads of publishing houses. Some of his Gdansk acquaintances suspected that his objectives may have been more than purely journalistic. To be sure, he did not "take care" of the entire artistic community, because, e.g., the theaters had their own mentor at the USSR consulate. Yakimishin himself was later to transfer to a job at that consulate. He was so well known among the Gdansk journalistic community that he was on a team of reporters who played a soccer match with local actors. He succeeded in gaining entry to the famous meeting with Solidarity by the then Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski at the Gdansk Shipyard, even though it was extremely difficult to be admitted there. It was a real sensation when Yakimishin took part in a procession organized in 1983 by the Rev. Henryk Jankowski on the occasion of 3 May, the anniversary of the first Polish Constitution. He even carried a crucifix that one of the older participating ladies passed on to him.

He was very much different from the typical arrival from the USSR: He was tall, good looking, elegantly dressed, and a favorite of women. All who remember him from those times stress his great resistance to alcohol. Two days after the aforementioned soccer match, during a libation on the premises of the Baltic Opera and Philharmony, several of his reporter friends unsuccessfully tried to get Yakimishin drunk. Still, despite his "strong head," his name got onto a police record when in a fit of drunkenness he got a car smashed.

Both during his stay in Gdansk and later, when he became an embassy employee in Warsaw (since 1992), he often played tennis. Sometimes he took part in marksmanship contests, and, when intoxicated, he showed others a handgun with which supposedly he never parted. Others among his acquaintances at the time recall that he liked fast cars and was one of the best all-around athletes they had ever known. During drinking bouts he boasted that he knew how to drive a tank, pilot a helicopter, and do parachute jumps, and that he even took part in an expedition into the interior of Siberia, where, carrying merely the gear of an average tourist, he had to survive for a month.

While in Warsaw, he lived in an apartment rented by a company called Dipserwis [Diplomat Services] (formerly FUMA—Enterprise for Housing and Administrative Services), which provides housing for foreigners and, according to our informant, is controlled by the Polish special services. It is likely that for some time Yakimishin availed himself of an apartment in Wilanow that had previously been occupied by Alganov. During his stay in Warsaw he loved to talk about his family. When with reporters he would steer the conversation to the activities of the Chechen center in Krakow. He left Poland in the fall of 1995.

Poland: Daily Views 'Minor' Coalition Crisis

WS2006143196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 19 Jun 96 p 3

[Commentary by Piotr Stasinski: "Hit Them With Zych"]

[FBIS Translated Text] They have hit us with Kaczmarek, then we will hit them with Zych in return. And we will set Miller on them. When they come down a peg or two, they will allow us to fire Buchacz or Podkanski, the bad ministers who remain in this government only because they have backing in their party. There will not be another humiliation, such as the one when Borowski resigned from a post in the Pawlak cabinet.

This is the reasoning the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] seems to have been using for some time now. Exactly the same can be seen in the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. It is not the first time the peasants are trying to oust [Privatization] Minister Kaczmarek. It is not the first time their leaders have distanced themselves from the government they have formed together with the SLD. It is not the first time Minister Miller [head of the Office of the Council of Ministers] is threatening that they will lose their offices. Finally, it is not the first time we are hearing talk about a reshuffle in the government. In short, this is not the first coalition crisis that will turn out to be only a minor dispute. Each time

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the common interests of the SLD and the PSL proved stronger than personal animosities and rhetoric. It is paying off for the PSL to play the role of an opposition party in order to raise its price within the coalition—and to wait until there appears in the right wing a force that offers the peasants a new coalition alternative... which will raise its political price even higher. What is exceptional about this crisis is the incredibly low level at which it is going on. The PSL attack has gone down to the level of anonymous leaks on conflicts in one of the National Investment Funds and the response from the SLD-linked NIE weekly, to the level of exposing 35-year-old harmful information on Sejm Speaker Zych. (endall) 19 Jun ws/lehman/pw RLE12006.025 20/1430

Poland: Police Eliminate Romanian Gypsy Colony in Warsaw

WS2006131396 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 20 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by "(Goch)": "Colony Liquidated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The colony of Romanian Gypsies underneath the Grot-Rowecki Bridge [in Warsaw] has been liquidated. Yesterday at 0400 policemen from the Zoliborz district and the Warsaw prevention forces began rounding up the Gypsies and taking them away. The policemen who took part in the operation said they did not put up any resistance.

The Romanians were taken to district police stations in Zoliborz and Praga Polnoc, from where they were transported to refugee centers. Within 48 hours the police are to prepare requests for their deportation. Some of the Romanians will most probably be deported to Ukraine. The site of the Romanian colony was razed by bulldozers. Cardboard houses were taken apart and set on fire. The Gypsies lived on the bank of the Vistula River for over two years. Municipal guard and police units will patrol the area to prevent the unwelcome visitors from returning.

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Romania: King Mihai Favors Constitutional Monarchy

AU2006121896 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 17 Jun 96 p 12

[Article by Gelu Trandafir: "My Duty Is To Reestablish a Constitutional Monarchy in Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] King Mihai and Queen Ana are currently on a one-week private visit in the Pays de Loire region in France. Yesterday, the royal couple attended a religious mass at the St. Basil Romanian Orthodox church in Nantes. On this occasion, the daily OUEST FRANCE (circulation: 800,000 copies) published an interview with the Romanian sovereign. Being asked about the role he believes he could pay in his homeland, King Mihai answered: "My duty is to reestablish the constitutional monarchy in Romania. The return to the monarchy must not be submitted to a referendum or a plebiscite, but simply by the Romanians' admitting the fact that what happened on 30 December 1947 was illegal," (the abdication of the King imposed by the Groza government). King Mihai considers that communism has not disappeared in the former socialist countries: "Only the Czechs have managed to distance themselves more from the former regime. In Romania, things are changing, but not necessarily for the better. People are frightened there, and therefore they do not say clearly what they genuinely want. This is what happened at the recent municipal elections, too, when very few Romanians showed up to vote."

Romania: New Democratic Political Class Seen To Emerge

AU2006203896 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 17 Jun 96 p 1

[Editorial by Petre Mihai Bacanu: "Advantage—Romanians!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The local elections are over. According to the votes cast for county councils, the PDSR [Party of Social Democracy of Romania] has not obtained the majority, the Romanians having sanctioned in this way the Iliescu-Vacaroiu ruling, in spite of the fact that the great Nasty [former tennis star Ilie Nastase] was running under that party's colors. The preference of voters went beyond the holes in a town [Ilie Nastase promised to fix all the roads in Bucharest]—since there are just as many holes on country roads that fall under the government's responsibility. The slow pace of the reform in Romania is considered to be the reason for the way in which people voted. Only the defeated were able—instead of calling people to the ballot—to pity them. Thus, people will again be dragged out of their homes and go to the voting stations, as if they were going into exile and were forced to work in the galley, instead of being asked to put a stamp on a piece of paper.

From now on, we are thinking of the legislative and presidential elections due on 3 November where, we assure you esteemed leaders, no one will be able to talk about the electorate's lack of maturity.

Seeing itself losing the electorate, the PDSR is no longer fighting for the 5 percent electoral threshold (which at one point was rumored to be 7 percent, because the PDSR thought that in this way it would be able to get rid of its old allies, which caused it enough headaches, and now are in a process of electoral mourning. The PDSR leaders believe that by keeping the 3 percent electoral threshold, it would give them the opportunity to achieve an alliance with the former ruling partners—satellite parties of a nationalist-communist nature—which, if necessary, are again useful to help keep them, at all costs, in power.

The PDSR, where despair has moved in, no longer cares that a changeover time has come also to Romania. The 180 degree turn in the PDSR policy and other similar maneuvers are part and parcel of the strategy of a drowning person.

The PDSR is thinking now of opening the gate for the small parties that it could assemble for a new government. That is the reason why it launched the action of "attracting people to the Party of Social Democracy of Romania" and started busily recruiting important people all over the country for what they call the captive electorate. Slowly, slowly the captive electorate will also realize that it has supported a corrupt party. Nevertheless, it is important that such an electorate, mainly with a low cultural level, is increasing the number of those who were absent from the ballots. One thing is certain, the voters started avoiding the ruling party. The autumn defeat will be even more humiliating.

With a 3 percent electoral threshold, we will see 149 candidates, not just 49, running for the office of Bucharest mayor at the next local elections. The inflation of candidates is dangerous. Seven years after the revolution, can we still not prevent political fragmentation? Especially now, when a precipice has opened between the ruling parties and their own electorate? The PDSR also agreed to 100,000 signatures, instead of 250,000 for the presidential candidate. One can resort here to a simple calculation: The more candidates the better, because in the runoff they will be able to pass their votes to Ion Iliescu. At the 3 November elections, more than at the 2 and 16 June elections, the electorate

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will have greater proof of the fact that the government is busier with the electoral campaign than with preparing the elections.

A general solidarity of the opposition is necessary for the general and presidential elections. Most certainly, the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] will be ranking first and will have the right to name the prime minister and form the government, which will be a coalition government. A united opposition can endanger the position of Ion Iliescu's party.

Romania's first departure from the European continent took place in June 1990. That was the time when we returned to barbaric times [reference to the miners' incursion in Bucharest]. That was followed by other barbaric acts, without kerosene lamps, namely, the Caritas games [money-multiplying Ponzi schemes], and the acts of robbery and corruption. Neither those responsible for the miners' incursion, nor the most corrupt people have ever been punished. As regards Ion Stoica [head of Caritas in Cluj Municipality], you could see how he was released after one year in prison. Although the Romanians had witnessed several Ponzi schemes that failed and resulted in many years in prison for the organizers, they went as if spellbound toward Stoica, for another painful experience. And here is Ion Stoica today, enjoying freedom. With 100,000 signatures taken from those who won at Caritas, we might see him in autumn taking part in the presidential race.

Foreign investors are worried that Romanians have not yet learned to respect the provisions of a contract. The Caritas mentality is the following: We get hold of the money in Romania by promising people that it will grow, and then we disappear. How can we be taken seriously when such a mentality prevails in our country in addition to the one about miraculous profits? This proves that we are still an unstable society. And of course, honest people are the victims. That holds true for the miners' incursion, for Caritas, as well as for the cases of corruption. Anything is possible because of credulous people. One might ask what is the effect of all this on the electorate. It is simple: Fear is spreading and distrust is increasing. The citizen starts disbelieving the state institutions. This is just like the paralyzing fear during the Ceausescu [former Romanian president] times when the master state punished all attempts to freedom. However, the Romanians started realizing that all the corrupt people, all crooks, and all the occult forces tacitly support the current leadership.

Only a united opposition will be able to pull the country out of catastrophe and mainly of the oppressive misery that was brought about by the nationalist-communists.

The Democratic Convention of Romania, through its action "Horizon '96" launched an extensive operation of selecting and preparing candidates, which means the rise of a new political generation. This happens also in the case of other opposition forces and the solution is a united opposition through the new political generation, capable of pulling the country out of the current impasse.

The time of great weddings for sports stars, just like the time to pay the debts (out of the taxpayer's money) of similarly famous candidates, or the time of defiantly wasting money, of manipulating the declarations of some important world personalities, and of cunning tactics is over.

The message of the electorate is the following: It wants a clear and profound change that would mean something for him as well. We can no longer look back, because a political class of a democratic nature has started to emerge in our country.

And so, good-bye to monopoly in the political sphere!

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Slovenia: Poll on Consequences of EU Associate Membership

AU2106113896 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 15 Jun 96 p 1, 3

[FBIS Summary] Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene on 15 June on pages 1 and 3 carries a report by Vlado Miheljak summing up the results of a public opinion poll on the expectations surrounding Slovenia's associate EU membership. As Miheljak writes, the telephone poll was carried out on 13 June among 664 randomly chosen subscribers, of whom 168 did not answer the phone and 68 either did not fit the selection criteria or refused to take part in the poll.

Asked whether the associate EU membership will bring positive or negative consequences, the answers obtained were the following:

Primarily positive consequences: 42.6%
Positive as well as negative consequences: 24.2%
Chiefly negative consequences: 16.5%
Neither positive nor negative (nothing will change): 1.2%
I do not now, I have no opinion: 15.3%

The pollees were also asked to assess who contributed the most toward the signing of the EU associate agreement. An accompanying bar chart shows that more than a third, 39 percent, either did not know or did not have an opinion; others attributed it to Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek (25 percent), the government (9 percent), Foreign Minister in Resignation Zoran Thaler (7 percent), and the Foreign Ministry (5 percent).

Slovenia: 3 Electoral Law Referenda To Be Held on Same Day

AU2106091596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At an extraordinary session, the State Chamber will shortly discuss the Constitutional Court ruling to call all three referenda on changes to the electoral legislation on the same day. The referenda are supposed to be held on the last Sunday in July or August. Here is a report by Janko Saradjen:

[Begin recording] The State Chamber deputies will be faced with a great dilemma—either to blindly obey the Constitutional Court ruling or to find an emergency way out in Article 16 of the Law on Referendum—which stipulates that the State Chamber does not need to call a referendum if the referendum question is ambiguous, if it requires additional explanation, of if its contents clash with the Constitution. The above limitations aside, the Constitutional Court ruling is clear. All three referenda should be carried out simultaneously on the same day, but separately. A special ballot should be printed for each referendum containing the question, the voting instructions, and the words for and against. A voter can attend only one or all of referenda. The number of voters and the vote is determined for each referendum separately. If several referenda with conflicting proposals were to succeed, the one binding for the State Chamber will be the one that will win the greatest number of votes in absolute terms.

The judges passed this Constitutional Court ruling with a narrow majority of five votes to four. The debate in the parliament will definitely be stormy, especially because not even those who had initiated the referenda, for example, the Social Democratic Party and a group of 35 deputies, are satisfied with the Constitutional Court ruling. What will definitely feature in the debate are the arguments used in the independent opinions by some constitutional judges, although these can in no way contest the legality of the Constitutional Court ruling. The judges who voted against this ruling, Dr. Ude and Dr. Sinkovec, stated that the Constitutional Court issued an interpretative ruling that lays out the rules of the procedure, thus, supplementing the law, which represents an intrusion on behalf of the Constitutional Court into the legislative branch of authority. The manner of ascertaining the outcome of the referendum is also supposed to be controversial.

In a separate, affirmative opinion, Dr. Jerovsek and Dr. Jambrek conclude that the Constitutional Court is the highest legislative authority for the protection of human rights, and the initiators of referenda doubtlessly had the right to request the calling of referendums. [passage omitted] [end recording]

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Federal

Federal: SPS Issues Statement on 'International Cooperation'

LD1906180596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1700 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 19 (TANJUG)—The policy of good-neighbourliness, peace and cooperation and development on equal footing, which is the programme pursued by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), has made it possible to reaffirm the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as an unavoidable and constructive factor in the peace process and stable development in the Balkans.

This was said in a statement issued Wednesday after a session of the SPS committee for international cooperation which discussed guidelines for strenghtening the international position of F.R. Yugoslavia and guidelines for international cooperation to be pursued by the party which holds the majority both in federal and republican governments.

Member of the SPS general committee and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic said in his introductory address that the reaffirmation of the policy and role played by F.R. Yugoslavia was reflected in a normalization of relations with the European Union (EU), a renewal of dialogue with international institutions and organizations and constant expansion of contacts and cooperation with the most influential states in the world, the statement said.

All that, along with relations which have been maintained with friendly countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, has helped overcome the previously existing unilaterality and prejudice in part of the international public, and Yugoslavia has been accepted as a partner in resolving regional issues and developing mutually beneficial forms of bilateral cooperation, the statement said.

At the same time, the SPS is successfully intensifying and expanding international contacts and cooperation with ruling parties and other leftist parties which advocate peace, equality, democracy and general progress.

The session positively assessed the overall results in the six-month implementation of the Dayton-Paris peace accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina which are the basis for lasting and stable solutions in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina and a prerequisite for regional stability and development. The session said that the leaderships of Serbia and F.R. Yugoslavia had greatly contributed to these results.

The statement pointed out that a consistent and comprehensive implementation of the agreement was essential and that the preparation and holding of free and fair elections as scheduled should be a priority in this phase of the peace process.

The SPS council believes that elections and the forming of new legal bodies in the Republika Srpska (RS), the Muslim-Croat federation and the bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will represent a turning-point towards stabilization and general success in implementing the peace agreement.

The statement said that the SPS supported and would support those political forces and parties which fight for peace, democracy and equality of all three constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina and which are opposed to unilaterality and extremism.

The session reiterated the party's principled stand that an equal treatment of the RS and the Muslim-Croat federation in all stages of the realization of the peace agreement had been and still was a prerequisite for a successful peace process. It is encouraging that most important international factors share these stands which were confirmed at a recent session of the international council for peace in Florence, the statement said.

The participants in the session said that the geopolitical position of F.R. Yugoslavia as a European, Balkan, Danubian and Mediterranean country, the widely ramified economic structure, the level of human, market and technological potentials, are important advantages which will be taken into account by the SPS in outlining its international cooperation and determining the foreign policy of F.R. Yugoslavia. Therefore, regional approach in cooperation with the former Yugoslav republics and traditional neighbours is a natural and logical expression of the european orientation in the foreign policy of F.R. Yugoslavia.

The SPS will continue to deepen cooperation with all leftist and democratic forces in order to turn the Balkans into a zone of peace, stability and economic and social prosperity. In Europe and elsewhere, the SPS will intensify cooperation with parties which are members of the socialist international.

The session said that it was growingly accepted in Europe and around the globe that an active participation of F.R. Yugoslavia in European and other international organizations and forums was an essential precondition for a successful implementation of the peace process, settlement of regional problems, stability and developing of integration process. Therefore, efforts will be stepped up to achieve the full reintegration of F.R. Yugoslavia into these international organizations on the basis of mutual interests and equality.

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The session pointed to the need for creating a modern, efficient, competitive and profitable economy which would stimulate and facilitate a speedy integration into integrative trends, the SPS committee for international cooperation said in its statement.

Federal: Lower House Adopts Bill on Ownership, Investments

LD1906213296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2043 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 19 (TANJUG)—The chamber of citizens of the Federal Assembly late Wednesday [19 June] adopted a number of system-related laws, including one on transformation of ownership of social capital, on bases for work relations, and amendments to the law on foreign investments.

The basic principles of the law on transformation of ownership are that companies are obliged to establish the value and structure of their capital and can independently decide on entering into the process of ownership change.

Ownership of social capital can be changed through sales of company shares in order to sell capital or increase it, through transformation of shares into funds, by turning investments and outstanding debts into a lasting deposit, and by selling the company.

The bill caused many comments and questions from deputies, even from House Speaker Radoman Bozovic.

Yugoslav Vice-Premier Jovan Zebic answered questions. He said the bill was one of the most important ones in defining the new economic system in Yugoslavia. He said a postponement of its adoption would mean a postponement of the privatization process.

Zebic said the law was sufficient grounds for the privatization process to begin at the expected rate and that it left enough room for the republics to work out all other issues regarding privatization with their respective laws.

The law on bases for work relations transforms work relations into a contract relationship between the employee and the employer. It secures greater flexibility of the employees, as required by the work process, and gives greater authorization to the directors. A novelty is that employees can resign, but also that they can be discharged by their employers.

The adopted amendments of the law on foreign investments creates conditions for major foreign investments, cuts down on the number of areas where foreigners cannot have a majority share, and there is a new chapter on concessions to foreigners.

Federal: Official, Cuban Envoy Discuss Upgrading Relations

LD2006192696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1805 GMT 20 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 20 (TANJUG)—Serbian Vice Premier Slobodan Babic and charge d'affaires of the Cuban Embassy in Belgrade Omar Medina Quintero on Thursday expressed interest in upgrading bilateral relations, especially in the field of health care service, and strengthening ties in the field of economy and culture.

Babic said that Serbia is prepared to promote and upgrade all forms of cooperation, especially in the field of economy, which require a stabilization of circumstances in the former Yugoslavia, the Balkans and Europe, the Serbian Information Ministry said in a statement.

Yugoslavia and its Republic of Serbia are giving their full contribution to this, Babic said and expressed hope that Yugoslavia would soon be enabled to return to all international organizations.

Federal: 'Inadequate' Assistance to Refugees Discussed

LD2106140596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1239 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 21 (TANJUG)—Coordinator of programmes of international humanitarian operations in the Swiss Red Cross Karin Speckhardt said on Friday that the situation with the relief of refugees in F.R. Yugoslavia was critical.

We have witnessed that humanitarian assistance is inadequate and we will propose general and long-term aid programmes, Speckhard told TANJUG at the end of a ten-day visit to Yugoslavia.

About 600,000 refugees from the former Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have found shelter in Yugoslavia.

Speckhardt visited collective refugee centres in the vicinity of Belgrade, Vojvodina and Montenegro, families who have accommodated refugees and soup kitchens for families in dire need.

In the past few months, the Belgrade delegation of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

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societies was sending alarming reports to bern and we have come to determine how critical the situation was, Speckhardt said.

The situation is difficult, particularly in Vojvodina, where nearly 200,000 refugees are accommodated, she said.

It is difficult to determine whose position is more awkward—there are the hosts who warmly received refugees but cannot feed them anymore and the refugees who know that they have become an unbearable burden to their hosts but have nowhere else to go.

The extremely difficult humanitarian position in Yugoslavia has prompted the Swiss Red Cross in March to send 158 tons of food for soup kitchens which feed 29,000 persons every day.

Swiss Red Cross donation's to the Yugoslav Red Cross last year were worth 1.8 million Swiss franks.

Serbia

Serbia: Political Parties Condemn Albanian 'Attacks' in Kosovo

LD2006222196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2147 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 20 (TANJUG)—The latest terrorist attacks on police by ethnic Albanian's in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija have been harshly condemned by the republic's political parties.

Two Serbian policemen were killed and one was injured in two armed attacks in the towns of Podujevo and Kosovska Mitrovica in northern Kosovo on Sunday and Monday nights.

Ratko Krsmanovic, an official of The League of Communists-The Movement for Yugoslavia, condemned the attacks and said the solution to the problem in Kosovo was much more simple than the West had been led to believe.

Krsmanovic told a press conference on Thursday that all peoples in Kosovo should get rid of their nationalist leaders, which, he said, called for a lot of new energy and tolerance.

Top party official Selim Berisa said the terrorist actions in Kosovo were not only the product of ethnic Albanian separatists, but had been 'nurtured by all those who took part directly or indirectly in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.'

Berisa said all the peoples in Kosovo would have to realize finally that terrorism was a threat to all people, especially to those from whom it stemmed.

New Democracy spokeswoman Rebeka Srbinovic said the party was dissatisfied over the tragic events in Kosovo and called for urgent dialogue as 'the only way to solve the problem in Kosovo.'

Serbia: Poll Assesses Views on Milosevic, Parties, Media

AU2106103296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1518 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Jun (BETA)—That Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is carrying out his presidential duties poorly is the assessment of the majority of Belgraders who took part in a poll conducted by the "MF" public opinion agency on 8 and 9 June in all 16 Belgrade municipalities, taken from a sample of 1,012 randomly selected individuals.

The results of the poll were distributed to all journalists at today's news conference organized by the Serbian Radical Party (SRS).

In all its earlier surveys, the Belgrade-based "MF" agency had always given the most reliable forecasts, said SRS leader Vojislav Seselj, adding that this particular agency had predicted the most accurate results for the 1993 elections.

Asked how Milosevic was performing his duties as president of Serbia, 28.27 percent of the polled persons said very poorly; 30.33 percent said poorly; 27.79 percent said satisfactorily; and 13.61 percent said Milosevic was carrying out his presidential duties very well.

At the next elections, about 22 percent of the polled individuals will vote for the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS); 17.96 percent will vote for the SRS; 17.88 percent are undecided; and 8.25 percent will give their votes to the Yugoslav Left (JUL).

According to the results of that poll, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) will get the votes of 7.64 percent of the polled individuals.

A possible coalition between the SPS, JUL, and New Democracy, would get the votes of one quarter, or 25.81 percent of the polled citizens. Slightly less, 25.48 percent, would give their votes to the SRS-DSS coalition.

The coalition "Together" ["Zajedno"] (The Serbian Renewal Movement, the Democratic Party, and the Citizens' Alliance) would receive 9.33 percent of the votes of the polled individuals, while 26.86 percent of them would be undecided.

According to the evaluation of 31 percent of the polled individuals, no television station has objective broadcasts; 23.11 percent feel that the broadcasts of Radio

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Television of Serbia (RTS) are the most objective; 16.96 percent believe Radio Television Studio B; 16.72 percent have faith in BK Television [Braca Karic Television]; while 12.21 percent trust Television Politika.

About 39 percent do not believe in the objectivity of the daily press; 25.05 percent believe what POLITIKA says; 11.28 percent trust VECERNJE NOVOSTI; 11.26 percent believe NASA BORBA; and about 10 percent rely on DNEVNI TELEGRAF.

Asked how they felt about religion, a little fewer than half the polled individuals, 45 percent, answered that they do not go to church regularly, but that they do believe in God and that they observe most of the religious holidays.

About 24 percent of the polled people answered that they believe in God, but that they do not go to church and do not observe religious customs.

According to the poll of Belgrade's "MF" agency, 16.95 percent of the polled citizens do not believe in God, while 15 percent do believe in God and go to church regularly.

Serbia: Parliament Speaker, German Envoy Discuss Cooperation

LD2006141696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1255 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 20 (TANJUG)—Serbian Parliament Speaker Dragan Tomic and German Ambassador to Yugoslavia Gerhard Schroembgens on Thursday said there were conditions for expanding economic and other cooperation between the two countries and for maintaining contacts on all levels.

Tomic expressed confidence that the German-Yugoslav cooperation will start to progress after the suspension of international sanctions against Yugoslavia and that a period of more favourable relations could be expected both in the political and the economic spheres, the Serbian parliament press service said in a statement.

The two sides expressed satisfaction that peace has been restored in the former Yugoslavia, which will enable the two countries to promote further their relations, which had been very good before the outbreak of the crisis.

The two sides discussed improvement of parliamentary cooperation between Serbia and Germany, and Tomic invited German parliamentarians to visit Serbia, the statement said.

Serbia: Minister Criticizes SANU Director's Kosovo Statement

AU2106093396 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 21 Jun 96 p 7

[Report by Kosova Information Center: "'Voluntarist and Irresponsible' Attitudes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a press statement, Serbian police chief [FRY Interior Minister] Vukasin Jokanovic severely attacked Aleksandar Despic, chairman of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences [SANU], regarding his statement on Kosova.

Regarding the Serbian Academy, Jokanovic states that "this institution should deal with the Kosova issue for at least five years in order to study the situation from all possible aspects, and only then may it issue statements." He also accused Despic of making a "voluntarist and irresponsible" statement and invited him to go to Kosova to get to know closely "Serbia's southern province!"

Jokanovic said that he does not believe that this is only Despic's idea. He said that some old proposition for the partition of Kosova is behind this idea, and only those who do not know Kosova can say this. According to Jokanovic, "the problem of Kosova does not exist, but there are problems in Kosova and they should be solved."

Montenegro

Montenegro: Bulatovic Hopes for IMF Admission by End of Year

LD2006223596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2218 GMT 20 Jun 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Milocer, Montenegro, June 20 (TANJUG)—The return of Yugoslavia to the International Monetary Fund can be expected realistically by the end of the year, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic told reporters late on Thursday.

Speaking at an annual conference of Yugoslav economists, held in the Adriatic resort of Milocer, Bulatovic said a positive outcome of political events would enable the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro to return to international financial organizations.

Bulatovic said that as far as he knew, economic issues were not outstanding. 'Our entire diplomatic activity is directed at the return of Yugoslavia to international institutions and organizations,' he said.

Bulatovic answered in the negative when asked whether the lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia were

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conditioned on the turning over of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and army commander Ratko Mladic to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

He said the only condition for the lifting of the sanctions was an end to elections in Bosnia.

Speaking of current economic problems, Bulatovic dispelled doubts that two economic systems were being created in Yugoslavia, adding, however, that someone ha[d] to be the instigator of changes at a particular moment.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova on Serbian Academy, 'Territory' of Kosovo

AU1706112996 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 15 Jun 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by Behar Zogjani on news conference by Ibrahim Rugova, "president of the Republic of Kosova," with unidentified correspondents in Prishtina on 14 June: "The United Nations' Positive Attitude Toward Kosova"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, said at yesterday's news conference that he welcomed the speech by U.S. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns, who said the opening of the U.S. office in Prishtina was good news for several parts of the world. He welcomed the requests by representatives Engel, Molinari, Lantos, Porter, and others addressed to President Clinton for the appointment of a special envoy to Kosova. He also welcomed the resolution on Kosova passed by Liberal International, which calls for European countries to open offices in Prishtina, the capital of the Republic of Kosova. [passage omitted]

The president of the Republic of Kosova also replied to a question about a statement by Serbian personalities regarding independence for Kosova, saying that this marked an advance for the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which is notorious for its first project on Kosova, which was also against everybody else in the former Yugoslavia. The demand for talks on the independence of Kosova means that the political consciousness of the Serbian political and intellectual elite has begun to change before that of the Serbian people.

As for the problem of redrawing Kosova's borders, our attitude is clear: Kosova has its own territory. It was a unit in the former Yugoslav federation, and we have not asked to change its borders. This would involve the other Albanian territories, which would be a new problem. I do not want to mention the partition of Kosova, because this is an old Serbian theory dating back to the Congress of Versailles from 1920 to 1925. As is well known, Cosic, the former president of the so-called FRY, also launched this proposal officially to Vance and Owen, the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, who categorically opposed it. However, the voices taking the initiative to talk about solving the problem of Kosova are positive, because it is an international issue. Of course economic interests lie behind the request for partition, because Kosova has many resources.

Kosovo: 'Serbian Criminals' Blame Albanians for Attacks

AU2106120496 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian police have stepped up their repression of Albanians following the latest incidents in Podujeve [Podujevo] and Mitrovice [Mitrovica], in which one Serbian policeman was killed and two were injured in questionable circumstances. Here is a telephone report by correspondent Qani Mehmedi from Prishtina [Pristina]:

[Mehmedi] The reports that continue to arrive from Mitrovice, Podujeve, and nearby villages confirm the new Serbian police raids on Albanian houses and the violence perpetrated against Albanians. The police broke into the house of Sheremet Rustemaj from Luze village in Mitrovice. The Albanian woman was arrested and seriously mistreated. Sherif Veseli from the same village and his son-in-law Ismail Hoxha from Mitrovice were also mistreated.

In Shipol in Mitrovice, the Serbian police severely beat a 70-year-old man, Fasli Durmishi. The police also searched the house of Haki Ajrizi, taking him and his son Xhemal to the police station. They were both interrogated about the killing of the policeman, whose murderer has still not been discovered.

The same is happening in Podujeve and its suburbs. It has created the impression that the Serbian power wants, by all means, to invent terrorism in Kosova and blame all Albanians for this, without providing any arguments.

Thus, regarding these incidents, the interior minister of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia, Vukasin Jokanovic, declared that the Albanian separatists intend to fulfill their separatist goals through terrorist attacks.

Meanwhile, the party of the Serbian criminal Arkan came out with the idea that even Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosova, as it is called, is behind these attacks against the Serbian police.

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This is not the first time that the Serbian criminals and power-holders have blamed the Albanians for terrorist acts, despite the fact that the perpetrators of the killings in Shtime [Stimlje], Decan [Decani], Peje [Pec], and Mitrovice two months ago and of the latest ones in Podujeve and Shipol in Mitrovice have still not been discovered.

There is no doubt that such accusations are made with the goal of incriminating the peaceful movement of the Albanians in Kosova and of discrediting it in the eyes of the international public. That is why there are many who consider that the Serbian political leadership, precisely the radical elements on the Serbian political scene, are involved in the killing of Serbian policemen in Kosova, in order to create a situation of neither war nor peace in Kosova.

Kosovo: Serb Police Said To Repress Albanians in Podujevo

AU2006143696 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the aftermath of the shooting incident in Podujeve [Podujevo] Sunday [16 June] evening, the Serbian police stepped up repression against the Albanian population in the municipality, LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] sources in Podujeve reported.

Reports of more cases of Albanians tortured by the police have reached the LDK Information Commission in Podujeve.

As reported, on Monday [17 June] the Serbian police interrogated Sylejman, Ali, and Ismet Blaku from Podujeve, Bajram Sylejmani from Sfecla, Rrahim Bashota from Llapashtice e Eperme, Afrim Azemi from Dumnica, and Muhamet Rexhepi from Podujeve. They were all reported beaten up severely at the police station.

Ibrahim Ejupi told KIC [Kosova Information Center] this morning he was likewise stopped late Sunday late evening by the Serbian police and was hit hard with the gun-butt and infected body injuries.

LDK sources in Podujeve said also that on Monday late afternoon the Serbian police ill-treated two old men, Daut Podvorica and Riza Podvorica, in the vicinity of the Dumosh agriculture airport.

It was reported says that yesterday (Tuesday) [18 June] heavy Serbian police forces besieged the home of Abdullah Murati in Podujeve. The police told his 14-year-old-daughter Lirije, who was alone at home, that they would soon be back.

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